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Shaffer v. Heitner: Some Thoughts
on Its Impact on the Doctrines

of Choice of Law and
Preclusion by Judgment
James M. Fischer*
The Supreme Court in Shaffer v. Heitner directed that the decision whether a
state can assertjurisdiction over a nonresident must be evaluatedaccording to the
minimum contacts among theforum state, the defendant, and the litigation. In this
article, Professor Fischer suggests that Shaffer has extended the obligations of
courts in renderingforum allocation decisions in cases having multistate impacts.
The author concludes that Shaffer mandates consideration of all relevantfacts and
consequences, including choice of law andjudgment effects, in determining where a
case having multistate aspects will be adjudicated.
INTRODUCTION

CONTROVERSY THAT has multistate contacts will give rise
to judicial decisions with multistate impacts. In an era in
which instantaneous cross-country commercial transactions and
four-hour coast-to-coast travel are routine, it is clear that state
boundaries do not provide the degree of insularity that they afforded in the past. It is therefore important to realize that when a
forum is called upon to adjudicate a multistate dispute, the decision to accept jurisdiction will have significant collateral consequences beyond that of geographically locating the case for
decision. These other consequences include: (1) determination of
the scope of matters to be, or to be treated as having been, decided
by the forum by force of claim and issue preclusion doctrines such
as compulsory counterclaim rules or the doctrines of res judicata
and collateral estoppel' and/or (2) determination of the substantive rule of decision in jurisdictions which use interest analysis2 or
one of its variants in making rule of decision determinations.
The product of the concepts of geographic forum selection,
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choice of law, and judgment inclusion or preclusion is synergistic;
the combined effect of these discrete concepts is greater than the
sum of each evaluated independently. Judicial recognition of this
synergism in jurisdictional disputes is crucial. It is one question
when a court that has a strong relationship to the controversy exercises jurisdiction, validates its local interests through choice of
law methodology, and compels the parties under pain of preclusion to present all of their claims for adjudication in that forum.
It is another question for a court to apply its choice of law methodology and define the scope of the judgment rendered when its
relationship to the controversy is weak. When a court examines
the jurisdictional problem in the traditional fashion, the total
repercussions of that analytical approach are often obscured. A
court which treats the forum allocation question as consisting
solely of the decision where geographically to decide the case fails
to perceive the circuity of effects engendered by the initial exercise
of jurisdiction. To illustrate, a court, once having exercised jurisdiction, may be called upon to validate local interests which only
become persuasive because the case is being litigated in that forum.
Especially since Shaffer v. Heitner,3 where the Supreme Court
abrogated the distinction between in personam and in rem actions,4 judicial failure to address the synergism in jurisdictional
disputes is untenable. The differing treatment afforded in personam and in rem actions was the bulwark upon which the traditional linear view of forum allocation flourished; it allowed a
compartmentalization of legal interests such that those additional
substantive implications which necessarily accompany the exercise of jurisdiction were minimized. Since that compartmentalization is no longer available to support traditional jurisdictional
analysis, it is incumbent upon the legal community to formulate a
new analysis to deal with the new range of jurisdictional variables
Shaffer ushered in.
3. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
4. Ajudgment inpersonam is personally binding upon the defendant. A judgment in
rem affects the interests of all persons in designated property. A judgment quasi in rem

affects the interests of particular persons in designated property.

RESTATEMENT OF JUDG-

§§ 1-9 (1942). Judgments quasi in rem are of two types. In one (hereinafter referred to as type I), the plaintiff seeks to secure a pre-existing claim in the subject property
and to extinguish or establish the nonexistence of similar interests of particular persons. In
the other (hereinafter referred to as type II), plaintiff seeks what is conceded to be the
property of the defendant in satisfaction of a claim against the defendant. Id. §§ 5-9,
quoted in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199 n.17 (1977).
MENTS
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In Shaffer, a shareholder of a Delaware corporation filed a derivative action against the corporation, one of its subsidiaries, and

a number of current and former officers and directors, alleging
breaches of fiduciary duty in causing the two corporations to sus-

tain a substantial adverse judgment in a private antitrust suit and
a large- fine in a criminal contempt action. In connection with the
derivative action, the plaintiff sought to invoke the Delaware

court's quasi in rem jurisdiction to obtain a sequestration order
under Delaware law on stock certificates owned by certain of the
individual defendants who were nonresidents of Delaware. 5
The central theme of the Court's opinion is that forum alloca-

tion decisions involving nonresident defendants must be based
upon the concept that all exercises ofjural power are proceedings
against the interests of persons.6 Consequently, the propriety of
the exercise of jurisdiction must be measured by the relationship
between the defendant and his or her legal interests and the fo-

rum, not merely by asserting authority over the defendant's property in the forum.7

The premise for this integrated theory of jurisdiction was not
new; it had been expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes while a member
of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.' Until Shaffer,
however, it lay fallow under the fiction that legal proceedings
could be competently directed against inanimate objects as well as

persons. The legal fiction of in rem jurisdiction allowed courts to
5. None of the certificates were physically present in Delaware. The sequestration
order was predicated upon a Delaware statute which declared the situs of shares of a Delaware corporation to be Delaware. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 169 (Michie 1974). Delaware
adhered to the view that shares of corporate stock were "on the books" of the corporation
in the state of its incorporation and could be "seized" by writs of attachment in that state.
Other jurisdictions have rejected this view and treat the res as being embodied in the stock
certificate. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 8-317(1). Under this view, writs of attachment can only issue
where the stock certificates can be physically taken into custody.
6. 433 U.S. at 212 ("We therefore conclude that all assertions of state court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in InternationalShoe [Co. P.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)] and its progeny.").
7. Id. at 214-16.
8. Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 55 N.E. 812, appeal
dismissed, 179 U.S. 405 (1900).
If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against some particular
person. . . or to bar some individual claim or objection. . . the action is inpersonam, although it may concern the right to, or possession of, a tangible thing
If on the other hand the object is to bar indifferently all who might be
.
minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established
. . the preceeding is in rem. . . . All proceedings, like all rights, are really
against persons. Whether they are proceedings or rights in rem depends on the
number of persons affected.
Id. at 76, 55 N.E. at 814.
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expand legal remedies by providing courts for creditor-suitors
wherever property of the debtor could be found. Seen in this
light, Shaffer evidences a judicial realization that the fiction
should no longer be utilized,9 that jurisdictional theory should accommodate reality rather than seek to be accommodated by legal

fictions.
In the aftermath of Shaffer, a court which seeks to assert juris-

diction over a dispute must focus upon the truly interested party
and his or her relationship to the forum. It is in this sense that

Shaffer has brought into play an integrated theory of jurisdiction.
It is the impact of this great transformation of legal methodology

upon current legal principles that is of concern here.
I.

FAIRNESS AND CONSEQUENCES COLLATERAL TO THE
ASSERTION OF JURISDICTION

Fairness and justice are relative concepts, not absolutes. Doc-

trine formulated in the abstract can often seem ill-advised when
applied to a specific problem. The theory ofjurisdiction expressed

in Shaffer carries the seed of this problem, for while the Court
confidently cast off the old learning of Pennoyer v. Neff, 0 it failed
to consider and to provide for the numerous doctrinal consequences that the old teaching had developed and nurtured. The
9. See L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 14, 19 (1967):
A fiction dies when a compensatory change takes place in the meaning of the
words or phrases involved, which operates to bridge the gap that previously exOne may test the question-whether a
isted between the fiction and reality ....
fiction is dead or alive by the inquiry, does the statement involve a pretense?
Probably the maxim "Qui facit per alium facit per se" [He who acts through another acts himself.] was originally a fiction because it was understood as an invitation to the reader to pretend that the act in question had actually been done by
the principal in person. But the statement has been so often repeated that it now
conveys its meaning (that the principal is legally bound by the acts of the agent)
direcily, the pretense that formerly intervened between the statement and this
meaning has been dropped out as a superfluous and wasteful intellectual operation. The death of a fiction may indeed be characterized as a result of the operation of the law of economy of effort in the field of mental processes.
With the recent extension of state jurisdiction through invocation of "long arm" statutes,
the former need to create in rem jurisdiction to provide a convenient forum for local creditors or for the advancement of important state interests such as the status of land title has
been greatly ameliorated. In most instances, a modem long arm statute could be fashioned
to allow the assertion ofjurisdiction over nonresidents who transact business in the state or
who own land in the state.
10. 95 U.S. 714 (1878). In Pennoyer,the Supreme Court established a theory ofjurisdiction that limited the jurisdictional reach of the states to their territorial boundaries but
gave them full, unfettered power over persons and property physically within the state.
The history of jurisdiction theory after Pennoyer is most pronouncedly marked by the erosion of this territorial concept. See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) (jurisdiction can be exercised over person domiciled, though not physically present, in the state).
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concept of territorialism, the postulate by which personal jurisdiction doctrine from Pennoyer to Shaffer was formed, did not exist
in a vacuum. The radiations of that concept affected doctrines
such as full faith and credit and choice of law. Full appreciation
of the impact of Shaffer upon current disputes having multistate
contacts requires further investigation into the present configuration of these aligned doctrines.
A.

FairnessandFull Faith and Credit

Traditionally, a court could exercise three types of jurisdiction:
inpersonam, in rem, and quasi in rem." The type of jurisdiction
used affected both the scope of the state's power to adjudicate the
dispute and the degree of recognition a sister state would be constitutionally' 2 required to give the judgment.
In Pennoyer v. Neff, 3 the Court began the marriage of due
process and full faith and credit when it held that a judgment that
was not enforceable in a foreign state (because it failed to comply
with the basic requisites of due process of law) could not be enforced in the rendering state. 14 Further, when a court improperly
exercised jurisdiction and rendered a decision, that judgment remained open to collateral attack, at least where the jurisdiction
issue had not been previously litigated.' 5 This impediment to
state power was easily avoided, however, by recasting the base of
jurisdiction as in rem and initiating the litigation by attaching or
otherwise bringing under the control of the court property of the
defendant having a situs (actual or fictional) in the forum. By
characterizing the exercise of jurisdiction as in rem or quasi in
rem, the court was able to adjudicate interests in the property
against the whole world or a portion of it. While a sister state was
required to abide by the rendering court's disposition of interests
11. See note 4 supra.
12. The "full faith and credit clause" of the Constitution provides:
Full Faith and Credit should be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general
Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
13. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
14. Id. at 732; see Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In
Personam JurisdictionofState Courts-From Pennoyer to Denkla: A Review, 25 U. CHI.
L. REV. 569, 573 (1958).
15. 95 U.S. at 732-33; see Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73
HARV. L. REV. 909, 991-98 (1960).
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in the res, it was required to do no more.16
Illustrative of this concept is Pennington v. Fourth .National
Bank. 7 A wife sued her husband for a divorce and alimony in
Ohio. To insure payment, she joined the defendant bank in which
her husband had an account. Eventually, the court entered an order that enjoined the bank from paying out any of the money in
the account to the husband and ordered that it be paid over to the
wife."8 The husband then presented the bank with a check for the
full amount of the deposit. Payment of the check was refused by
the bank. The husband thereupon commenced an action for the
deposit account claiming that the court's order was invalid since
he (1) was a nonresident of the state of Ohio, (2) had not been
personally served with process within the state, (3) had not voluntarily appeared in the suit, and (4) had been served by publication
only.' 9 The Supreme Court upheld the order:
The Fourteenth Amendment did not, in guaranteeing due
process of law, abridge the jurisdiction which a State possessed
over property within its borders, regardless of the residence or
presence of the owner. That jurisdiction extends alike to tangible and to intangible property. Indebtedness due from a resident to a nonresident--of which bank deposits are an
example-is property within the State .... The only essentials
to the exercise of the State's power are presence of the res
within its borders, its seizure at the commencement of proceedings, and the opportunity of the owner to be heard. Where
these essentials exist a decree for alimony against an absent defendant will be valid under the same circumstances and to the
16. The judgment in rem exhausted itself upon the attached property. See, e.g., Riley
v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1941). Riley concerned the propriety of relitigation
by a Delaware court of the question of ownership of certain shares of stock which were part
of the decedent's estate. Ownership turned upon the determination of where the decedent
was domiciled at the time of her death. A prior Georgia judgment had determined her
domicile to be Georgia, but New York Trust Company, as temporary administrator, maintained that her domicile was New York. In ruling upon the range of the Georgia judgment, the Court observed:
It may be assumed that the judgment of probate and domicile is a judgment in
rem and therefore, as "an act of the sovereign power," "its effects cannot be disputed" within the jurisdiction. But this does not bar litigation anew by a stranger,
of facts upon which the decree in rem is based. . . . While the Georgia judgment
is to have the same faith and credit in Delaware as it does in Georgia, that requirement does not give the Georgia judgments extra-territorial effect upon assets
in other states. So far as the assets in Georgia are concerned, the Georgia judgment of probate is in rem; so far as it affects personalty beyond the state, it is in
personam and can bind only parties thereto or their privies.
315 U.S. at 353 (citations omitted).
17. 243 U.S. 269 (1917).
18. Id. at 270.
19. Id. at 270-71.
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same extent as if the judgment were on a debt-that is, it will
be valid not inpersonam, but as a charge to be satisfied out of

the property seized. 2 °
Where a state had sovereign power over ares, it could adjudicate all interests in the res and issue a decree which would protect
any holder of the res from the possibility of multiple liability. In
other words, in any later proceedings involving the same res

brought by a nonappearing claimant of the res against the holder,
the holder could plead satisfaction of the prior in rem or quasi in
rem judgment as a bar in whole or in part to the second action. 2'
This, however, was all the in rem action accomplished. There was
no claim preclusion (merger or bar as a result of the first judgment), nor was there any issue preclusion (collateral estoppel).2 2
This resulted because the legal definition of what was determined
and concluded by a valid quasi in rem or in rem action differed

substantially from the legal view of what was determined and concluded by a valid inpersonam action.23
20. Id. at 271-72. See also, American Express Co. v. Mullins, 212 U.S. 311 (1909) in
which a state judgment was predicated upon the confiscation of a res (a shipment of whiskey) in the possession of American Express. The shipper was precluded from recovering
the value of the res against American Express where American Express had timely notified
the shipper of the existence of the in rem action.
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 66, comment (f), § 68, comment (e) (1969).
22. See id. § 66, comment (f).
If the plaintiff brings an action against a defendant who is not personally subject
to the jurisdiction of the court and a thing belonging to the defendant is attached,
the plaintiff's cause of action is not merged in any judgment the plaintiff may
obtain. The plaintiff may maintain an action in the same state, or in another
state, on the original cause of action.
Id.
Although a valid judgment in rem is binding on all the world as to interests in the
thing which is the subject of the action, it is not conclusive as to a fact upon which
the judgment is based in any subsequent action not involving interests in the
thing, except as to persons who have appeared and actually litigated the question
of the existence of the fact.
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 73, comment (c) (1942). The same principle applies to
judgments quasi in rem. Id. at § 75, comment (c).
23. While courts generally require actual litigation to bring into play the doctrine of
issue preclusion (collateral estoppel), most jurisdictions treat a default judgment as having
claim preclusion (res judicata) consequences. See Developments-Res Judicata,65 HARV.
L. REV. 818, 839 (1952). Thus, defenses and counterclaims of the nonresident defendant
may be barred by operation of the default judgment. Traditionally, the problem was ameliorated by the fact that the in rem action was limited to the res itself. In essence, the res
defined the cause of action. See, e.g., F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.21
(2d ed. 1977) ("Since the basis of the court's authority is the property itself, the court cannot purport to determine the claim itself; the judgment determines only whether defendant
retains the property. . . or plaintiff takes it ..
"). Since Shaffer, however, it is the claim
that is legally and actually determined. The consequences of the judgment are unclear
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Consequently, the practical effect of affording in rem judg-

ments full faith and credit was no more prejudicial to the nonresident than the consequence of being subjected to quasiin rem or in

rem jurisdiction in the first instance. The prejudice sustained by
the nonresident was the forced election: the defendant could appear in the in rem action and defend his or her property interests,

thereby converting the action to an inpersonam action (unless the
forum recognized a limited appearance),24 or forego an appearance and prevent the transformation of the action to a personal

adjudication, but suffer the inevitable loss of his or her property
by default judgment.2 5 In essence, the problem of prejudice re-

duced itself to the evaluation of competing policies. The absence
of a limited appearance on the one hand required the defendant to
make the forced election described above. On the other hand, it

provided an economic incentive for the nonresident to appear, allowed the conversion of the action into an in personam proceed-

ing, and avoided the possibility of a multiplicity of suits involving
basically one transaction or occurrence. Moreover, since the juris-

dictional base was limited, the loss potentially sustained by reason
of the forced election was confined to the property seized. It was

not amplified by any judgment attributes such as claim preclusion
or issue preclusion which would be enforceable against the non-

resident.
The above point is best illustrated by examination of a type II
quasi in rem action,26 since such a suit did not proceed upon any
theory that a claim to specific property was the basis for the action, as would have been the case with a true in rem action.2 7 The

type II quasiin rem action was based upon a personal claim by the
plaintiff against the defendant. Through seizure of the property

by judicial process, the inpersonam claim became a claim against
because of the uncertainty surrounding the scope of the Court's new integrated doctrine of
inpersonam jurisdiction.
24. The limited appearance provided the nonresident with an immunity from service
of summons while he or she defended his or her property; the plaintiff was thereby prevented from converting the action into an inpersonam suit by serving the defendant while
he or she was in the forum. See Cheshire National Bank v. Jaynes, 224 Mass. 14, 112 N.E.
500 (1916). However, it did not prevent a sister state from treating the limited appearance
as, in effect, an in personam proceeding. See Harnischfeger Sales Corp. v. Sternberg
Dredging Co., 189 Miss. 73, 191 So. 94 (1939).
25. See Taintor, Foreign Judgments In Renr Full Faith and Credit v. Res Judicata in
Personam, 8 U. PITT. L. REv. 223 (1942); Note, Effect ofa GeneralAppearance to the In
Rem Cause in a Quasi In Rem Action, 25 IowA L. REv. 329 (1940).
26. See note 4 supra.
27. See id.
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the property that had been subjected to the court's jurisdiction.
The forum exercised jurisdiction to proceed against the nonresident, but only for the limited purpose of condemning his or her
interests in the res.
The treatment of quasi in rem judgments under the full faith
and credit clause is demonstrated in Huron Holding Corp. v. Lincoln Mine Operating Co.28 In that case, Lincoln obtained a judgment against Huron in a federal district court in Idaho. While
Huron appealed the judgment rendered in favor of Lincoln, a
third party sued Lincoln in a New York state court by garnishing
Huron, a New York corporation, and constructively serving Lincoln. Huron answered the garnishment, admitted it was Lincoln's
judgment debtor, and alleged that an appeal of Lincoln's judgment was pending. After the federal court of appeals affirmed
Lincoln's judgment, the New York state court rendered judgment
against Lincoln, and Huron paid.2 9 The Supreme Court held that
the Idaho federal district court must give full faith and credit to
the New York judgment and Huron's payment thereunder. 30 In
other words, the quasi in rem action was entitled to full faith and
credit insofar as the judgment affected property interests properly
brought under the jurisdiction of the court, but it did not affect the
in personam claim. Where a plaintiff properly invoked quasi in
rem jurisdiction to adjudicate a personal claim (such as damages
for breach of contract), he or she could obtain a valid default
judgment and satisfy that judgment up to the value of the property seized pursuant to judicial process. Moreover, the plaintiff
could sue the debtor again on the original claim to recover any
balance due which was not satisfied as a result of the quasi in rem
action; but he or she could not sue on the judgment nor use the
judgment to establish the validity of the claim.3 ' Only in a sense,
therefore, was it accurate to say that quasi in rem judgments were
entitled to full faith and credit. Before Shaffer, a valid quasi in
rem action foreclosed, against properly notified individuals, 32 in28. 312 U.S. 183 (1940).
29. Id. at 186-87.
30. Id. at 189, 194.
31. See notes 21-22 supra.
32. Proper notification in a type II quasi in rem action required actual notice by the
garnishee to the creditor. See, e.g., Huron Holding Corp. v. Lincoln Mine Operating Co.,
312 U.S. 183 (1940).
It has not been urged here, nor was it urged in the courts below, that Huron
was guilty of any negligence, misconduct or fraud in connection with the New
York judgment. It has not been claimed that there was a failure to give Lincoln
notice of the New York suit against it.
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terests in the property seized. It did not foreclose any interests in
the underlying claim save for the rule that a plaintiff could have
only one satisfaction.3 3
That the full faith and credit consequences of quasiin rem actions were not as broad as the full faith and credit effects of in
,personamactions did not diminish the practical consequences of
such judgments. To the extent that quasi in rem judgments were
entitled to full faith and credit, they were identical to inpersonam
judgments. For example, in Sanders v. Armour FertilizerWorks,3 4

Sanders was entitled under certain fire insurance policies to a sum
certain. 35 The policies were issued by two Connecticut insurers to
Sanders, a resident of Texas. The insurers subsequently became
"indebted" to Sanders by reason of a loss of Sanders' property due
to fire. Under Texas law, the insurance proceeds, like the underly-

ing insured property, were exempt from judicial execution. The
Armour Company, Sanders' creditor, sued Sanders in an Illinois

state court by garnishing the Connecticut-based insurance companies who were doing business in Illinois.36 The insurance companies interpleaded Sanders and the Armour Company in a federal
district court in Texas, where the question of the relationship between the Texas exemption statute and the Illinois proceedings
arose. 37 The Court held that the Illinois garnishment created a
judicial lien on the insurance proceeds that was entitled to full
39
faith and credit.3 1 Just as in the case of inpersonam judgments,
Id. at 189. Actual notification, however, was not a prerequisite to the exercise of type II
quasi in rem jurisdiction; rather, it was a judicially developed requirement that had to be
satisfied so that the garnishee could avoid paying twice-once in the garnishment action
and once again in a suit maintained by his or her other creditor. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S.
215, 226-28 (1905).
33. Indeed, the genesis of the rule was to avoid double payment. See id. at 226 ("It
ought to be and it is the object of courts to prevent the payment of any debt twice over.").
34. 292 U.S. 190 (1934).
35. The indebtedness of the two insurers was adjusted at $3400.00 and $4250.00, respectively, a sum they each agreed to pay. Id. at 196.
36. The proceeding was based upon notes given by Sanders which undertook to waive
his homestead and exemption rights under Texas law. The garnishee insurers admitted a
debt owed to Sanders and gave notice of his claim that the proceeds of the policy were
exempt under Texas law. Id. They also apparently gave notice to Sanders. Id. at 209.
37. Id. at 202-06.
38. Id. at 204. Justice Cardozo's dissent did not contradict the basic premises of the
majority opinion. However, he did voice objection to the majority's characterization of the
effect of the garnishment proceedings under Illinois law. The majority held that garnishment created a lien upon the debt or res which, when followed by a judgment, created "a
paramount right or superior equity" to the insurance proceeds. Id. The dissent argued
that "[glarnishment in Illinois does not create a lien upon the debt or chose in action subjected to the writ." Id. at 206 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). The judgment, in the absence of a
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the constitutional demand for full faith and credit outweighed the
reluctance of one state to execute the judgment of a sister state.4
Another case illustrating the scope of quasiin rem judgments is
Chicago Rock IslandandPacific Railway Co. . Sturm. 4 1 Sturm, a
resident of Kansas, held a claim for wages due to him by the railroad.42 Garnishment proceedings were properly brought against
the railroad in Iowa by a creditor of Sturm. While the Iowa proceedings were in progress, Sturm brought an action in Kansas
against the railroad for the wages. The amount that the railroad
owed Sturm was exempt from execution under Kansas law. The
railroad had timely notified Sturm of the pendency of the Iowa
proceedings and had interposed the defense of exemption in the
Iowa action.4 3 In the Kansas action, the railroad interposed the
defense of the Iowa garnishment proceedings; however, the de-

fense was rejected by the Kansas courts.'
The Supreme Court reversed. Although the decision dealt pri-

marily with the question of the situs of the debt,45 the Court held
further that exemption claims are remedial and hence subject to
the law of the forum. 4 6 Iowa was entitled to ignore the Kansas
exemption, while Kansas was obligated to give full faith and
lien, did not operate in rem. Id. at 209 (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714 (1878)). Hence, to give the Illinois proceedings full faith and credit operated to
give them greater effect "than they have by law or usage in the courts of Illinois." Id. at
dissenting).
206 (Cardozo, J.,
39. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908). In Lum, the Court required Mississippi to give full faith and credit to a Missouri decree confirming an arbitrator's award on a
futures contract. The contract had been created in Mississippi, but enforcement of the
contract was prohibited in Mississippi courts because Mississippi law treated futures contracts as gambling obligations and hence illegal contracts. Nevertheless, the Court ordered
enforcement of the Missouri decree even though to do so ran counter to Mississippi's substantive legal interests and public policy.
40. Id. at 236-38.
41. 174 U.S. 710 (1899).
42. The facts of the case were not set forth in the Court's opinion. They are drawn
from the syllabus prepared by the Reporter.
43. Id. at 718.
44. Id. at 712.
45. Id. at 717.
46. Id. The characterization of the issue as remedial was important because the application of Iowa law to a controversy whose only connection with the forum was the presence
ofthe res might otherwise run afoul ofdue process constraints. See Home Insurance Co. v.
Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) (application of Texas law to controversy before Texas court on
quasi in rem theory of jurisdiction violates fourteenth amendment due process where the
acts upon which the claim of liability is based bear no relationship to the forum). While
the presence of the res would support the exercise of jurisdiction, it would not, of itself,
support the application of the forum's own rules of decision to the adjudication of the
dispute.
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credit to the Iowa garnishment proceedings in that payment by the
extinguishedprotanto its obligation to its credgarnishee railroad
47
Sturm.
itor,
By means of similar analysis, in rem actions involving stockholder assessments pursuant to statutory schemes of the state of
incorporation were held conclusive as to the necessity for, and the
amount of, the assessment even though the stockholders were not
made parties to the proceeding which levied the assessment. 48 It
was still, however, open to any persons over whom the court did
not have in personam jurisdiction to assert that they were not
stockholders4 9 or raise other personal defenses.5
In summary, a judgment-whether in personam, in rem, or
quasi in rem-was "entitled to faith and credit for just what it is,
and no more."' Prior to Shaffer, there existed an easy equilibrium between the law of jurisdiction and the full faith and credit
clause. The full faith and credit clause required that each state of
the union recognize and give credit to the lawful judgments rendered by sister states. On the other hand, jurisdiction doctrine
limited the power of the rendering state and, hence, qualified the
force of the judgment, not only in the rendering state but also in
sister states.5 2 Where the rendering state could exercise in personam jurisdiction over the nonresident, the doctrines of claim
and issue preclusion took full effect since the power of the rendering state over the nonresident entitled the rendering state to incorporate these attributes of a judgment into the decree. However,
where jurisdiction was premised upon property of the nonresident
located within the forum (in rem jurisdiction), the power of the
rendering state was constrained by the due process clause to the
property or res itself, the force of the judgment was exhausted on
the property or res. As this was all the rendering state could do,
47. See Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 87 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring):
Neither the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution nor the Act of Congress

implementing it says anything about final judgments or, for that matter, about
any judgments. Both require that full faith and credit be given to "judicial proceedings" without limitation as to finality. Upon recognition of the broad meaning of that term much may some day depend.
48. Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935).
49. See Great Western Telegraph Co. v. Purdy, 162 U.S. 329 (1896).
50. See Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243 (1912); see generally, Moore & Oglebay,
The Supreme Court and FullFaith and Credit, 29 U. VA. L. REv. 577, 559-93 (1943).
51. Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 87 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring).
52. See Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 197 (1915)
('The two clauses [due process and full faith and credit] are harmonious and because the
one may be applicable to prevent a void judgment being enforced affords no ground for
denying efficacy to the other in order to permit a void judgment to be rendered.").
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this was all a sister state was required to recognize and credit.
Any problems of "fairness" were thus resolved at the jurisdictional end of the lawsuit by the characterization of the action as in
personam or in rem. There was no need to evaluate the propriety
of exercising jurisdiction by any analysis of the full faith and
credit implications of the judgment.
The Court's acceptance in Shaffer of an integrated theory of
jurisdiction obscures this neat categorization. The case of Combs
P. Combs5 3 illustrates the problem. Combs involved the effect to
be given an Arkansas judgment, which cancelled a lien on land
situated in Arkansas, in a Kentucky proceeding brought to recover on the debt that the lien had secured. The Kentucky court
characterized Arkansas' jurisdiction as in rem and limited the effect of the judgment to removal of the lien. 4 The judgment was
not seen as affecting interests in the debt itself.-5
In the aftermath of Shaffer, it is not as likely that the use of the
in rem characterization would provide such a facile resolution of
the question. On the one hand, Shaffer indicated that characterization of the jurisdictional base as inpersonam, in rem, or quasi in
rem does not abrogate the requirement that the requisite level of
forum contacts exist so that the exercise of jurisdiction does not
offend due process requirements.5 6 On the other hand, the Court
strongly implied that the ownership or possession of land or an
interest in land would of itself constitute a sufficient relationship
to the forum to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction over causes of
action or claims relating to the land.-7 Thus, were Combs v.
Combs decided today the result could well differ: the land was
located in Arkansas and the agreement creating the lien on the
land was entered into by the nonresident with knowledge that the
land was located in Arkansas. Cancellation of the lien would
53. 249 Ky. 155, 60 S.W.2d 368 (1933).
54. Id. at 161, 60 S.W.2d at 370.
55. Id. at 162, 60 S.W.2d at 370-71.
56. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
57. Id. at 207-08. Indeed, two justices specifically concurred upon the understanding
that quasi in rem jurisdiction survived Shaffer where the res consists of a fixed immovable
such as realty. Id. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring); Id. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens further intimated that where one acquires a res in a foreign jurisdiction, one
knowingly assumes the risk that in rem type jurisdiction can be asserted. Id. Several lower
federal courts have so construed Shaffer. See, e.g., Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry
Inc., 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978) (jurisdiction acquired by attachment of debt upheld
where creditor of the garnishee had substantial contacts with the forum); Feder v. Turkish
Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (jurisdiction acquired by attachment of nonresident's forum bank account upheld).
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probably necessitate that the debt be fixed and determined. From

a facts and circumstances perspective, there is no meaningful difference between the lien and the debt. Consequently, one would
hesitate to advise the lienholder that the debt would not be lost

through res judicata or a compulsory counterclaim rule. Although
the rendering court might (1) treat the validity of the lien as a
cause of action distinct from the debt58 or (2) treat a second action
as not impairing rights established under the first action, 59 and

thus preserve the lienholder's debt claim, after Shaffer there is a
greater risk that a court would be required under the full faith and

credit clause to hold that the first judgment cancelling the lien also
precluded relitigation of the underlying debt. Today, a creditor in

a Combs-type action, instead of facing a nonbinding in rem action
extinguishing the lien on the land, might be confronted with a
binding adjudication of the debt itself.
The potential defendant in a Combs-type case encounters a
new election problem in the post-Shaffer era. Prior to Shaffer, the

election was between losing the land or appearing; the post-Shaffer election may be between losing the entire claim or appearing.

In reality such a litigant now has no election at all since the consequences of nonappearance may be as severe as entering an appearance.60 While prior to Shaffer jurisdictional standards
defined the cause of action, now they do not.
58. See, e.g., Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), cert.
denied,357 U.S. 569 (1958), where the court used a minimum contacts due process analysis

to determine whether jurisdiction in rem could be exercised to adjudicate a nonresident
trustee's interest in trust funds. The court made no attempt to allocate a situs to the funds.
,4tkinson thus presents a case involving personal jurisdiction over a nonresident limited to
the disposition of the nonresident's interest in the res. A similar result is reached in jurisdictions which apply the Seider doctrine. See, e.g., Comment, Quasiin Rem on the Heels of
Shaffer v. Heitner. If the InternationalShoe Fits... 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 486 (1977).
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 56.1 (Tent. Draft 1973):

Effect of Failure to Interpose Counterclaim
(1) Where the defendant may interpose a claim as a counterclaim but he
fails to do so, he is not thereby precluded from subsequently maintaining an action on that claim, except as stated in Subsection (2).
(2) A defendant who may interpose a claim as a counterclaim in an action
but fails to do so is precluded, after the rendition ofjudgment in that action, from
maintaining an action on the claim if:
(a) The counterclaim is required to be interposed by a compulsory counterclaim statute or rule of court, or
(b) The relationship between the counterclaim and the plaintiff's claim is
such that successful prosecution of the second action would nullify the
initial judgment or would impair rights established in the initial action.
60. Under the full faith and credit clause, the consequences of the judgment throughout the nation are determined by the consequences of the judgment in the state of rendition. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943); Riley v. New York Trust Co.,
315 U.S. 343 (1941); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 95 (1969).
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Shaffer, in the course of doctrinal reformation, worked a
profound change in the way courts relate fairness considerations
to multistate disputes. Prior to Shaffer, the concept of fairness was
largely relegated to resolution of the problem of competing interests posed by the characterization of the jurisdictional base as in
personam or in rem. Where the basis of jurisdiction was in rem,
the legal system perceived it as not unfair to require the defendant
to elect between forfeiting the res by nonappearance and consequent default or appearing to defend, thereby converting the lawsuit into an inpersonam action. 6' The risk of litigation involving
the res was simply an incident to or burden of property ownership. Shaffer inadvertently confounds this system of established
risks. To use Combs as an example: Is it fair as a matter of due
process of law to require a nonresident to litigate at the place
where the security is located (Arkansas) instead of at the place
where the debt was incurred or formalized (Kentucky)? The Shaffer Court, on the one hand, recognized that the states need to be
able to clear title, remove clouds, and entertain actions involving a
res located within the state.62 On the other hand, if the state court
may compel a nonresident to submit to its jurisdiction on these
matters, what consequences, if any, result? To what extent may
63
the forum impute to the judgment attributes of claim preclusion?
What effect, if any, must a sister state give to such a judgment? If
full faith and credit sets a bottom line of recognition and effect
which a sister state must give to a judgment, does due process set
an upper limit of recognition that a state may give to a sister state
proceeding? 4
The preceding questions demonstrate a curious irony of Shaffer: Shaffer has not really worked a remaking of jurisdiction the61. See text accompanying notes 22, 23 & 25 supra.
62. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208 (1977).
63. See text accompanying notes 106-22 infra.
64. See note 24 supra. Even where the rendering state would not treat the matter as
res judicata, the enforcing state may as a matter of comity. See, e.g., McElreath v.
McElreath, 162 Tex. 190, 345 S.W.2d 722 (1961) (giving recognition to a foreign decree
purporting to convey realty located within the forum although not required to do so by the
full faith and credit clause, citing Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909)). The enforcing state
may also give greater effect to the judgment than the rendering state as a matter ofjudicial
efficiency. See, e.g., Hart v. American Airlines, 61 Misc. 2d 41, 304 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Sup. Ct.
1969) (applying forum doctrine of collateral estoppel, which did not require mutuality of
estoppel for in-forum application, to a Texas judgment). See also Worthley v. Worthley,
44 Cal. 2d 465, 468, 283 P.2d 19, 22 (1955) ("Since the New Jersey decree is both prospectively and retroactively modifiable . . . we are not constitutionally bound to enforce defendant's obligations under it. . . . Nor are we bound not to enforce them.").
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ory (in the sense of forum allocation principles) as much as it has
worked a redistribution of the point at which the fairness question
ihust be resolved. In the post-Shaffer era, the question a court
must resolve is whether it is fair to allow a state to affect legal
interests by judgment in situations where the relationship between
the nonresident and the forum is marginal. The basic problem
remains, but its focal point has changed: must the nonresident
appear or default? If the nonresident appears, is it wise, or consistent with the full faith and credit clause that he or she be allowed
to relitigate questions of liability in later proceedings? Is it wise,
or consistent with the due process clause that the nonresident finds
his or her claims and defenses foreclosed because the focus of inquiry is the claim rather than, as before, the res that was attached
and brought under the control of the court? The Shaffer opinion
itself provides no clear response to this continuing conflict in forum allocation decisions of the antinomies of fairness to parties
and efficiency to courts.
B.

Fairnessand Choice of Law

Under modem choice of law analysis, the decision where a
controversy will be adjudicated strongly influences resolution of
the issue of which jurisdiction's rules of decision will be applied to
resolve the case. This relationship comes about as a result of constitutional interpretation and modern choice of law doctrinal development. The practical effect of these two factors is that a state
asserting jurisdiction over the parties to a dispute will probably
decide to apply its own law to resolve the underlying dispute.
At the constitutional level, the Supreme Court has been increasingly tolerant of a forum state's decision to apply its own law
to controversies having only a tenuous nexus to that state. This
tolerance is illustrated by Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.6 5 In
65. 377 U.S. 179 (1964). The Court has docketed a case which will provide it with an
opportunity to reexamine the continued vitality of Clay. Rush v. Savchuk, 440 U.S. 1211
(1979), involves the constitutionality of the application of Minnesota law to a suit which
arose in Indiana between Indiana residents. After the accident at issue, the plaintiff-guest
moved to Minnesota and commenced an action by attaching the defendant-insured's policy
issued by State Farm Insurance Co. State Farm was required to defend the insured in the
event of a lawsuit claiming negligent operation of the vehicle and indemnify him up to
policy limits for any judgment rendered against him. Jurisdiction over State Farm in Minnesota was predicated solely on the fact that State Farm was doing business in the state.
The choice of law conflict arose over the fact that under Indiana's guest statute the plaintiff's action was barred; under Minnesota law the action could proceed. The choice of law
issue may, however, not be reached. Unlike the normal Seider case, see note 83, infra, in
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that case, an insurance policy was purchased in Illinois while the
insured was a citizen and resident of that state. The insurer was a
British corporation licensed to do business in Illinois, Florida, and
several other states. A few months after purchasing the policy, the
insured moved to Florida and became a citizen and resident of
that state. Subsequently, a loss occurred for which the insured
sought reimbursement under the policy. The problem was that
the policy contained a clause that barred any claim not sued upon
within one year of its maturity. This clause was valid under Illinois law but was invalid under the law of Florida where the action
was brought. 66 Simply put, the insured's action was not barred if
Florida law applied, but it was barred if Illinois law applied. The
Court seemed to have little difficulty upholding the application of
Florida law.67 It noted the ambulatory character of insurance
contracts, the fact that the policy provided worldwide coverage,
and the fact that the insurer knew that the insured had moved to
Florida.68 Unfortunately, the Clay decision is notably silent on
whether a due process analysis of a forum's choice of law rules is
predicated upon a showing of sufficient forum contacts or sufficient forum interests. 69 Other pronouncements by the Court on
Sa ,chuk the plaintiff obtained an after-acquired residency; he was not a forum (Minnesota) resident at the time the underlying accident occurred.
66. 377 U.S. at 180-81.
67. Id. at 181-82.
68. Id.
69. The insurer never did anything that could be said to constitute a forum contact.
At best the relationship between the insurer and the state of Florida rested upon the foreseeability that the insured and his property would become situated in Florida. Yet, while
this would certainly speak for coverage of a loss occasioned after the insured left Illinois, it
does not address the question of why the validity of the twelve month suit clause was
deemed to be governed by Florida law. On the other hand, Florida did appear to have an
interest in protecting forum domiciliaries against contractual statutes of limitation in derogation of Florida statutory law.
If Clay allowed the choice of law question to turn on forum interest, however, this
would seem to render nugatory Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). In Home
Insurance, Dick, a citizen of Texas, commenced an action against Compania General, a
Mexican corporation, to recover on a policy of fire insurance for the loss of a tug. The loss
had occurred in Mexican waters. Jurisdiction was asserted in rem through garnishment by
ancillary writs against American reinsurers of the risk assumed by the Mexican corporation. The insurance policy had been issued by the Mexican company in Mexico to one
Bonner of Tampico, Mexico. It was assigned to Dick in Mexico prior to the loss. The
policy covered the tug only in certain Mexican waters. At the time the policy was assigned,
and until after the loss, Dick actually resided in Mexico. The question before the Court
was whether Texas could apply its longer statute of limitations to save Dick's action. The
Court held it could not.
There are factual points to distinguish Clay from Home Insurance, notably the worldwide coverage and movement to the forum before the loss occurred which are present in
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the subject have been similarly vague. 70 Nonetheless, Clay evidences a tolerant attitude toward a forum's use of local law to
adjudicate a controversy as long as some reasonable basis exists,

measured by some relationship between the forum and the controversy. If such a basis does exist, the question of which choice of
law doctrine is to be applied loses its federal significance. In essence, such a decision amounts to an adequate and independent
nonfederal ground upon which to predicate the forum's decision.71
At the nonconstitutional level of choice of law doctrinal for-

mation, the approach of most modem theorists and courts has
been to abandon or at least severely limit the jurisdictional selection formulas of the First Restatement.72 Whether a forum adopts
the view that state interest provides the methodology for resolution of choice of law questions, 73 the most significant relationship
test of the Second Restatement,74 rule orientation,7 5 or enlightClay but not in Home Insurance. Nevertheless, if Clay expresses a constitutional test for
choice of law predicated upon state interest, Home Insurance is severely undermined since
Dick was a Texas domicilary and Texas therefore did have an interest, legitimate or otherwise, in providing a forum for the adjudication of the controversy on the merits.
If, on the other hand, Clay used a forum contacts or mixed forum contacts/forum interest, reasonable relationship test, then Clay is reconciliable with Home Insurance. The factual disparities between the cases allow for the different results based upon either contacts
counting or on the basis of foreseeability, i e., the likelihood at the time of contract formation that the law of a foreign jurisdiction would become applicable in whole or part to the
controversy.
70. See generally, Martin, ConstitutionalLimitationson Choice ofLaw, 61 CORNELL L.
Rev. 185 (1976). See also, Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End ofan Era,53 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 33, 80 (1978).
71. See Weintraub, Due Processand Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a State's
ChoiceofLaw, 44 IowA L. REv. 449,456-57 (1959); but see Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59,
64 (1938) ("While this Court reexamines such an issue [choice of law] with deference after
its decision by a state court, it cannot, if the laws and Constitution of the United States are
to be observed, accept as final the decision of the state tribunal as to matters alleged to give
rise to the asserted federal right."). Reconciliation may be achieved by recognizing that
outside of certain unique areas such as fraternal associations, see Weintraub, supra note 71,
at 475-77, the current view of the Court seems to be that the federal right exhausts itself
upon the reasonable connection requirement. See Currie, The Constitution and the Choice
o/Law: Government Interest andthe JudicialFunction, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 9 passim (1958).
72. In theory, the approach of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws was to design
choice of law rules that would assure the same treatment for a case regardless of the fortuitous circumstances which often determine the selection of the forum. Thus, wherever the
action was brought, the law of a particular jurisdiction would supply the rule of decision.
See R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS, CASES-COMMENTS-QuESTIONS 13-14 (1975).
73. See Currie, Married Women's Contracts: .4 Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25
U. CHI. L. REv. 227 (1958), reprintedin B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS 77 (1963).
74. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145, 188 (1971).
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ened territorialism,7 6 the clear force of each doctrine is, to varying
degrees, to ameliorate the theoretical, but never actual, neutrality
of the jurisdictional selection formulas of the First Restatement.
Modem choice of law theory, for reasons that appear to be
largely pragmatic, encourages parochialism on the part of the
states. While this seems to run counter to an ideal implicit in the
full faith and credit clause that disparate sovereign entities be
united under one law,7 7 it can be explained by the realization that
the goal of uniformity necessary to the enforcement of judgments
does not require a total abnegation of the forum's law to the law
of another involved jurisdiction. A broad, expansive interpretation of the full faith and credit clause in connection with choice of
law decisions would penalize whichever jurisdiction first decided
to provide a forum, as it would then be required by constitutional
command to defer to the law of the other jurisdiction involved.7"
Such a result would be absurd. Moreover, while the need for uniformity may be great with regard to enforcement of judgments,
that need may not assume the same degree of intensity when applied to the laws of sister states. The reasons for this dichotomy
were cogently explained by Reese and Kaufman:
The second consideration [behind the Court's rare requirement that the forum apply the law of a sister state] lies in the
objective sought to be attained by the full faith and credit
clause itself. This objective, it is believed, is to confer some of
the benefits of a unified nation while at the same time safeguarding the essential interests and powers of the states. Rarely
will the interests of a particular state outweigh the national
need that judgments be given the same effect throughout
the
79
country that they enjoy in the state of their rendition.
Reese and Kaufman noted, however, that the same considerations
did not necessarily apply to the field of choice of law:
A judgment resolves only one or more existing controversies
between a limited number of persons. A choice-of-law rule, on
the other hand, looks to the future by providing that a given
75. See, e.g., Reese, Choice of Law. Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 315,
316-17 (1972).
76. See Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism and Professor Cavers-ThePennsylvania
Method, 9 DUQ. L. REv. 373 (1971) (choice of law decisions should be made with reference
to the place where legally signifcant events occurred). A legally significant event encompasses, for example, the state where a tort is committed. Id. at 390.
77. See Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1953).
78. See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm., 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935)
("In each, rights claimed under one statute prevail only by denying effect to the other.").
79. Reese & Kaufman, The Law Governing CorporateAffairs: Choice of Law and the
Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1130-31 (1958).

SHAFFER

P.

HEITNER

question, whenever it arises, shall be decided by the application

of a particular state's law. A requirement that a state apply a
given choice-of-law rule is therefore far more likely to affect its
interests adversely than would any obligation on its part to recognize and enforce sister-state judgments. Consequently, perhaps a greater national need is required to justify rules of faith

and credit in the field of choice of law than in the field ofjudgments.8s

As a result of the Court's "hands-off" approach, choice of law
doctrine has largely developed as an insular inquiry. Because of

this mixture of constitutional laissezfaire and doctrinal parochialism, one must pause before suggesting that choice of law questions
not only necessarily, but also properly, impact upon forum allocation decisions. That they necessarily impact is easily demonstrated by choice of law doctrinal parochialism: modem choice of
law doctrine often appears designed to provide a rationale for
courts to apply their own local law.8 Yet, to suggest that choice
of law considerations ought to be extended to a unified forum allocation theory is not an argument in support of parochialism. It

does suggest that choice of law consequences ought not to be ignored. The right of a forum to apply local law to a case over
which it may exercise adjudicatory authority does not demand ei-

ther the application of local law or the exercise of adjudicatory
authority. Rather, since the decision where to hear the case will

impact upon the choice of law decision itself, the total analysis
should be assimilated so that in deciding whether to exercise juris-

diction, courts evaluate all of the possible impacts of that decision
upon the outcome of the adjudication. It is the totality of these
80. Id.
81. The above observation is more intuitive than empirical. Nonetheless, even though
candor on the part of courts, see Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. App. 1972) (when
the court has jurisdiction of the parties its primary responsibility is to follow its own substantive law), and commentators, see Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUM.
L. REv. 1283, 1243 (1963) (if a conflict between the legitimate interests of two states is
unavoidable, it should apply the law of the forum), is rare, one is struck by the number of
instances in which courts define false conflicts and true conflicts in such a fashion as to
uphold the application of local law. See Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d
380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966); Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Ore. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964).
Similarly, where courts engage in plain interest evaluation, see Bernhard v. Harrah's Club,
16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976), or the search for the better law, see
Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973), a propensity to uphold local
law is observed. Of course, there are exceptions; yet, the clear tendency is to apply local
law. Indeed, it is difficult to distinguish in practice the so-called "new learning" in the field
of choice of law from the ad hoc method of characterization used under the ancien regime
of the First Restatement. See, e.g., Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953);
Levy v. Daniel's U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 A.163 (1928).
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impacts that ought to be considered and evaluated as a part of the
basic determination whether to provide a forum. The decision by
the forum to exercise jurisdiction ought not to be made simply
upon the basis of presence, domicile, or minimum contacts.
Rather, those concepts should merely initiate the analysis. The
court should extend the inquiry to ascertain in what manner a decision to assert jurisdiction will affect the legal interests of involved parties. To generalize, one would suspect on an intuitive
level that resolution of a choice of law controversy, occasioned
largely as a collateral consequence of the forum selection process,
would "meaningfully affect" the inquiry whether jurisdiction exists. On the other hand, the formal rules for service of process or
style of pleadings used by a jurisdiction would not, in nearly every
case, appear to have a "meaningful impact" upon the forum selection inquiry. Of course, many factors that would affect the jurisdictional decision will not be known at the time the jurisdictional
question is to be resolved. Such a situation is unavoidable. Yet,
the inability of the parties or the court to have the capacity to
perceive all consequences of the jurisdictional decision does not
mean that those consequences that are perceived ought to be ignored.
Since the interrelationship between the decision where geographically to decide the case and the choice of law decision is
fundamental, the legal approach to resolving jurisdiction issues
must be altered. Presently, the jurisdictional inquiry, under the
compulsion of Shaffer, appears limited to consideration of the defendant's forum contacts in determining whether jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant may be asserted. Choice of law doctrines, especially those that emphasize forum interests as the sine
qua non of doctrinal analysis, often retain, however, a focus upon
the plaintiff s forum contacts. In many cases, therefore, these two
interrelated factors are separately measured and independently
evaluated with the synergistic consequences to the parties often
passing by the court unnoticed.
An example ofjudicial failure to recognize the synergistic relationship of jurisdiction issues and choice of law analysis may be
found in the recent case of O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp. 2
O'Connor involved the question of the post-Shaffer constitutionality of the Seider doctrine.83 In O'Connor, an action was com82. 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978).
83. Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966) (action by
New York residents arising from accident outside the state against nonresident defendants
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menced in New York by a widow to recover for her husband's
wrongful death. The incident giving rise to the claim arose in Virginia. The defendants were a Virginia corporation and one of its
employees. The New York connections were plaintiffs residence
and the situs there of the insurer's contractual obligation to defend
and indemnify. The choice of law question involved the liability
of a third party in tort notwithstanding that the plaintiff had received a workmen's compensation award. Virginia law barred the
action while New York law did not.
The court sustained the constitutionality of the Seider doctrine
by focusing upon the contacts of the purported "true" defendant,
the insurance carrier.84 The court noted that the insurance carrier
was doing business in the forum and that the plaintiff's claim related to those activities." Hence, insofar as due process analysis
under Shaffer was concerned, the constitutional standard was satisfied and New York was a proper forum in which to entertain the
claim.8 6

On the choice of law issue, the court found that New York law
should be applied to resolve the question of liability in tort. 87 The
decisional analysis, however, was somewhat obscured by the cursory fashion in which the choice of law issue was resolved. Several prior decisions had upheld the forum's application of local
law to a Seider-type case where it was "foreseeable" that the insured would deal with forum residents as part of his or her usual
course of business.88 The foreseeability issue serves to tie the case
to Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd."9 O'Connor, however, did

not posit its choice of law analysis upon foreseeability. Rather it
based its decision upon section 183 of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws which provides: "A state.

. .

is not precluded

by the Constitution from providing a right of action in tort or
in which jurisdiction was predicated on attachment of the defendants' interests in liability
insurance policies issued by companies doing business in New York). Seider was constitutionally upheld in Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), adhered to en
banc, 410 F.2d 117, ceri. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969).
84. 579 F.2d at 200-01.
85. Id. at 201-02.
86. In essence, the insured in a Seider-type case becomes a nominal defendant inasmuch as the insured is afforded the right to make a limited appearance and the Seider
judgment carries with it no preclusive consequences to the insured, save for the disposition

of "rights" to the insurance policies.
87. 579 F.2d at 205-06.
88. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438, 444 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.

856 (1973).
89. 377 U.S. 179 (1964), discussed supra at notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
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wrongful death by the fact that the defendant is declared immune
from such liability to the plaintiff by the workmen's compensation
statute of a sister state. . . -"0 As the comments to section 183
make clear, however, that section's application is contingent upon
there being a "sufficient relationship to the issue and to the person,
thing or occurrence to make application of its law reasonable."'"
From all that appears in the court's opinion in O'Connor, this relationship is established by the mere fact that the decedent is a
domiciliary of the state of New York. Such a holding would seem
to be carrying a good thing a bit too far. Certainly, none of the
illustrations to section 183 supported the application of New York
law on the basis of the facts in O'Connor. In each illustration,
some meaningful activity, such as the events leading to the formation of the employer-employee relationship or the injury itself, occurred in the state whose law was to be applied. Indeed,
O'Connor is really the converse of the illustrations set forth in
section 183. Each of those illustrations concerns the power of the
state of injury to provide to a plaintiff a remedy in tort or wrongful death against a party who is immune from such liability under
the law of another state. That was not the case in O'Connor. The
Supreme Court did state in Carrollv. Lanza9 2 that a state could
apply its local law to hold a defendant liable for tort or wrongful
death even though the defendant is declared immune from such
liability by the workmen's compensation statute of a sister state
under which the plaintiff has obtained, or could obtain, an award
against another person. Nonetheless, when one looks beneath the
generalization, one discovers that in Carrollit was the state of injury that abolished immunity, hence, there was a sufficient relationship to allow application of that state's rules regarding tort

liability.
In addition to its analytical deficiencies, the result in O'Connor
is flawed by its disparate treatment of the jurisdiction and choice
of law issues. However compelling the court's arguments as to
each issue, the net result of the decision was that a lawsuit which
was almost entirely the concern of .Virginia was litigated in New
York under New York law. The deleterious impact of these decisions on the defendant was largely ignored by the court. And
while arguments might be offered to justify this anomalous result,
none were tendered by the decision. It is suggested that in the
90. RESTATEMENT
91. Id.

(SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS §

92. 349 U.S. 408, 412-13 (1955).

183 (1971).
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aftermath of Shaffer this linear analysis is no longer proper. Shaffer's emphasis upon fairness as a due process defense to the assertion ofjurisdiction suggests that the total consequences of litigating

in the forum must be considered. This not only implicates notions
of convenience but also considerations of choice of law and the
consequences of claim or issue preclusion.
II.

THE REALIZATION OF AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF FORUM

ALLOCATION

Any attempt to integrate the due process and full faith and
credit clauses into jurisdictional analysis must begin with the realization that each clause of the Constitution looks primarily to and
promotes different goals. The full faith and credit clause 93 -seeks
to further national unity by binding the courts of the several states
into one, enhancing the efficient administration of justice. 94 The
due process clause,9" as presently construed, recognizes that state
territorial boundaries do matter and that rather than enhancing
the efficient administration of justice, forum allocation doctrine
should look to the just and fair allocation of judicial authority
within the confines of a limited territorialism. 96 While there is
some accord between the two clauses in the sense that inefficiency
tends to beget unfairness, the prime goals of each clause, as applied to jurisdictional analysis, appear to be at cross purposes.
Notwithstanding this inconsistency of goals, the American legal system has traditionally sought to accommodate and harmonize the due process and full faith and credit clauses. Indeed, no

reason exists why, in the absence of textual evidence or policy
compulsion to the contrary, one of the clauses of the Constitution
ought to control forum allocation decisions to the exclusion of
93. The text of the full faith and credit clause appears at note 12 supra.
94. See text accompanying note 77 supra.
95. The "due process clause" of the fourteenth amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law....
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
96. The term "limited territorialism" is used in a descriptive sense. In the aftermath
of Shaffer, state territorial boundaries serve as convenient benchmarks to provide an easy
method of observation and calculation of data by which the forum selection process proceeds. Shaffer does not appear to imply any return to the theme of normative territorialism, ie., territorialism itself defining the nature of the legal system, as found in Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). See Hazard, A General Theory of State-CourtJurisdiction, 1965
Sup. CT. REv. 241; see also note 121 infra.
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other relevant clauses. The challenge thus presented is to seek
some methodology by which the inherent values of both the due
process and full faith and credit clauses may be realized.
A.

Preservingthe CurrentMethodologyfor Harmonizationof the
Due Process andFull Faith and Credit Clauses

In Shaffer, the Court intimated that the integrated theory of
jurisdiction espoused was not an "all or nothing" approach. The
quality of forum-related contacts could give rise to an ever-increasing power on the part of the forum to exercise a greater degree of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. For
example, isolated contacts involving property in the forum might
authorize a limited personal judgment equal to the value of that
property. 97 Thus, Justice Marshall observed in Shaffer:
The Full Faith and Credit clause, after all, makes the valid in
personam judgment of one State enforceable in all other
Once it has been determined by a court of compeStates ....
tent jurisdiction that the defendant is a debtor of the plaintiff,
there would seem to be no unfairness in allowing an action to
realize on that debt in a state where the defendant has property,
whether or not that State would have jurisdiction
9 8 to determine
the existence of the debt as an original matter.
The thrust of this observation appears to be that, while previously in a type II quasi in rem action the underlying claim would
lie hidden under the fiction that the action was against a "thing"
located in the state, under the integrated theory espoused in Shaffer, the claim itself would constitute the action. The "thing" located in the state would constitute a forum contact which
comprises part of the total relationship between the nonresident,
the cause of action, and the particular forum. As such, Justice
Marshall's statements indicate that an inpersonamjudgment, limited to the value of the "thing" located in the forum, could be
97. See note 58 supra. Professor Silberman observed:
It is quite possible, however, that certain minimum contacts that are insufficient
when standing alone in an in personam action might pass the constitutional
threshold in a quasi in rem action when coupled with the attachment of the defendant's property in the state. For example, in this country the citizenship or
residence of the plaintiff, without more, has never been adequate to confer jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant not present in the state. Yet perhaps the
plaintiff's residence together with some other contact like the physical presence of
the defendant's property in the state or a connection between the claim and the
property might be enough to trigger the lower (or quasi in rem) level of a newly
fashioned International Shoe inquiry. Certainly nothing explicit in Shaffer precludes these possibilities.
Silberman, supra note 70, at 72 (citations omitted).
98. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210, 210-1 1 n.36 (1977).
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obtained and enforced either against property of the defendant in

the forum state or against other property of the defendant in a
sister state. And as the number and quality of contacts increases,
full jural power over the person of the nonresident could be exercised without limitation to the value of any property of the nonresident defendant in the forum. 99

This hierarchical approach suggests that the minimum contacts test of InternationalShoe'00 may require a greater degree of
forum contacts in one type of case than in another. An example is
a recent Second Circuit decision, Intermeat,Inc. v. American Poul-

try, Inc.10 Intermeat, a New York corporation, brought suit in
New York to recover damages from American Poultry, an Ohio
corporation, for the wrongful rejection of a shipment of meat.
The trial court held that it lacked in personam jurisdiction over
99. See, e.g., Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352
(1976); Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 I11. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961); cf., Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry, Inc., 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978)
(discussed infra at text accompanying notes 101-03).
100. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In InternationalShoe,
the Court made the conceptual break with Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), when it
reformulated jurisdiction theory to allay extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction as a matter
of course. The Court stated the test thusly:"
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line between
those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those
which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative. The test is not
merely, as has sometimes been suggested, whether the activity, which the corporation has seen fit to procure through its agents in another state, is a little more or a
little less ....

Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the

quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration
of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure. That
clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no
contacts, ties, or relations.
326 U.S. at 316, 319.
InternationalShoe teaches, and Shaffer confirms, that the test for finding jurisdictional
authority over nonresidents lies in the fairness and reasonableness of the exercise of that
authority. These standards, imprecise though they are, have important consequences because they demand of courts a total, thorough analysis of not only the defendant's relation
to the forum but also the consequences, to the defendant, of exercising jurisdiction. It
hardly suffices under a fairness test to suggest that the test can be satisfied by only a partial
examination of the question, an examination only of what the defendant has done, without
an inquiry into the consequences to the defendant should jurisdiction be exercised. It is an
inadequate analysis which stops when the defendant is required to "come" to the forum
and does not examine what the defendant is going to be required to do, and what the
consequences of those acts are, once he or she does come and defend.
101. 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978).
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American Poultry, apparently on statutory grounds. However, Intermeat was allowed to attach a debt owed American Poultry by
the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., a corporation doing business
in New York, which exceeded the amount of the claim. The forum contacts were substantial, involving numerous contracts for
the sale of imported meat between the parties, prior agreements
between the parties to arbitrate disputes in New York, and substantial sales of meat by American Poultry to persons doing business in New York. Nevertheless, the court specifically limited the
question before it to the propriety of jurisdiction by attachment:
The difference between an in personam jurisdiction and a
jurisdiction by attachment of a debt is that, in the former case
: * . we would have to decide the continued strength of the "doing business" concept in New York law, and hence decide
whether the acts done in New York by American Poultry were
enough to support such jurisdiction under N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 301,
as well as enough to satisfy the test of InternationalShoe. On
the other hand, in dealing with jurisdiction based upon an attachment, the test is narrower. The test is not whether the defendant is "doing business" in New York, a concept which a
state, if it wishes to, is still free to assert as a minimum requirement, but whether there are sufficient contacts to make it fair
and just that the foreign corporation be required to come to
to defend the action that was begun by attachNew York
10 2
ment.
The approach used by the court raises some interesting questions. For example, would a defendant in an attachment proceeding be required to pose any counterclaims that arise out of the
same transaction or occurrence that gave rise to the plaintiffs
claim in the attachment proceedings? If the defendant failed to do
so, would the counterclaims be lost by way of rule preclusion (failure to assert a compulsory counterclaim) or claim preclusion
under the doctrine of res judicata?
Professor Carrington has implied that under such circumstances no compulsory counterclaim (and by implication, no claim
preclusion) should be mandated:
The attractions of the compulsory counterclaim rule are substantially dissipated when it is applied to nonresident defendants whose relation to the forum may be very attenuated in
light of emerging concepts of personal jurisdiction. . . . [I]t
would seem proper for courts to recognize the extra harshness
of the total litigation concept as applied to interstate situations
and to mitigate it by the use of a more conservative forum
102. Id. at 1022 (citations omitted).
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rule.1 03
Professor Carrington's position has been criticized on the
ground that he failed to adequately account for the fact that compulsory counterclaims are generally required to arise out of the
transaction or occurrence that gave rise to the plaintiff's claim."o
Hence, a factual nexus between the nonresident, his or her claim,
and the forum could in most instances be properly presumed to
exist. This would justify, on principles of utility, the establishment
of a rule of general application such as a rule requiring the assertion of all common transaction or occurrence claims. Such an observation would appear to hold true for jurisdictional analysis in
the post-Shaffer era inasmuch as the underlying claim to what was
heretofore an in rem action now constitutes the basis for the limited inpersonam action. Shaffer thus intensifies the problem: to
the extent jurisdiction over the claim may be exercised with respect to the claim on the basis of fewer contacts than would otherwise sustain full in personam jurisdiction, °5 the basic fairness
question whether to require the nonresident to do more than defend his or her interest is heightened.
Another aspect of the problem of preclusion is suggested by
inquiry into what collateral consequences attach to the judgment
obtained by the plaintiff if the attachment is less than the claim
and the nonresident has appeared and defended. The question
arises whether it is consistent with elementary notions of fairness
to apply, in limited inpersonam actions, the hard and fast rule that
all issues determined by a valid judgment are precluded, subject
to constitutional limitations, by the law of the state where the
judgment is rendered.' 0 6 Insofar as the rendering state is concerned, if the forum can give its judgment issue preclusion effect,
this would convert what in form was a limited inpersonam action
to what in substance is a full inpersonam action. A similar consequence may be realized if the same were done by a sister state.
Indeed, it is not unusual that issues actually and necessarily de103. Carrington, CollateralEstoppel and Foreign Judgments, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 381,
390-91 (1963).
104. See R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, supra note 72, at 738.
105. As noted by Professor Silberman, "If the minimum contacts test for quasi in rem
actions is equivalent to the one used for personal jurisdiction, then the Shaffer Court probably eliminated quasi in rem jurisdiction as we have known it." Silberman, supra note 70,
at 71-72. Post-Shaffer decisions have to date indicated that there is no equivalency; the

minimum contacts standard for attachment actions is less than that requires for full in
personam actions.
106. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 95, comment g (1971).
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cided by a judgment of a court having limited jurisdiction are
07
foreclosed from reconsideration in a sister state.1
Traditionally, problems attendant to the preclusion consequences of in rem or quasiin rem judgments were constrained by
the narrow definition of "cause of action" which attached to those
proceedings. The term "cause of action" was limited to defining
only the res before the court.10 8 As such, neither the plaintifrs nor
the defendant's claims were merged into the judgment, nor were
fact adjudications upon which the judgment was based deemed to
be conclusive for purposes of establishing an estoppel.10 9 It is
doubtful, however, whether this narrow definition of a "cause of
action" survives Shaffer. The rejection of the presence of property
as an adequate and independent ground for the assertion of jural
power to affect the legal interests of nonresidents, coupled with the
Court's emphasis that the claims upon which relief is requested
have a factual nexus with the forum,"1 0 belie any attempt to resurrect the "cause of action" formula that sustained the inpersonamin rem dichotomy of the Pennoyer era. Thus, courts are now
faced with the prospect of determining what faith and credit must
be given and what degree of recognition may be given to a judgment disposing of a "cause of action" where that judgment is
predicated upon a jurisdictional base of less than sufficient forum
contacts to warrant the exercise of traditional in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident.
It is the state of judgment rendition which defines "cause of
action" for purposes of claim or issue preclusion under the full
faith and credit clause."' If a state has a compulsory counter107. See text accompanying notes 113-20 infra; see also note 64 supra.
108. See Note, Developments in the Law: State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV.
909, 949-50 (1960).
109. Id.
110. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
111. See note 60 supra; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 95
(1969). The Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 61 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973) has moved
away from attempting to provide rules for categorizing the concept of "cause of action" as
a unit of measure for purposes of merger or bar in favor of expressing factors which the
court should consider:
What factual grouping constitutes a "transaction" and what groupings constitute
a "series" [transaction and series being the putative units of measure], are to be
determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the
facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties'
expectations or business understanding or usage.
Id. § 6 1(a). Nevertheless, it is the law of the state of judgment rendition that controls the
question of the faith and credit to which the judgment is entitled in a sister state. Hence,
analysis must return to the basic question of the extent to which the integrated theory of
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claim rule that applies to the situation, or if the state would provide the judgment so rendered with the attributes of claim and
issue preclusion, the full faith and credit clause would arguably
transmute a limited personal action into a full inpersonam action
insofar as the question of preclusion by judgment is concerned.
This results because the failure to comply with compulsory claim
requirements as effectively bars their later assertion as if they had
in fact been presented and denied as part of a full in personam
adjudication. Moreover, under traditional analysis, the result
seems unimpeachable. The forum has jurisdiction over the person-the only type of jurisdiction Shaffer recognizes. Consequently, the full faith and credit clause demands recognition of
the lawful judgment thus rendered. Since jurisdiction over the
person did exist, due process objections to affording the judgment
full faith and credit are largely stilled.
The problem presented is that the scope ofjudgments rendered
under an hierarchial approach to jurisdictional analysis is unknown. The problem does, however, resemble the conundrum
posed by the intersection of the limited appearance and the doctrine of issue preclusion. Where a court can compel a nonresident
to litigate a claim, and he or she does so litigate (which he or she
must do or risk losing any interest in the resolution of the claims
arising out of the transaction or occurrence giving rise to plaintiffs
actions), one must discern the nature and scope of such judgments
in order to address the problem of the impact of claim and issue
preclusion upon those judgments. It is not questioned that such
judgments are entitled to some faith and credit. The question is
how much is too much and how little is too little. With the increasing tendency to simplify the interstate recognition of judgments, creation of an hierarchial system of in personam
jurisdiction could lead to a functionally more expansive long arm
because the jurisdiction issue would merely serve as the tip of the
iceberg. Submerged below, out of sight, would lie the same judgment consequences to the parties as would be occasioned by an
exercise of full inpersonarn adjudication. This would seem, based
upon the rationale and result of Shaffer,1 2 to be more than the
Court intended by its decision.
In addition to the question what an enforcing state must do
jurisdiction espoused in Shaffer affects the power of a state to give its judgments preclusive
effects.
112. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), and text accompanying notes 3-9
si/pra.
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with a sister state's judgment, there is the problem of what it may
do. With Shaffer's transmutation of the quasi in rem action into
some form of inpersonam action, one would reasonably expect to
see a greater incidence of appearances by nonresidents to defend
their interests against claims asserted against them. This in turn
raises the question of what preclusion consequences such an appearance might generate and whether the recognition of preclusion consequences over the minimal demands of the full faith and
credit clause poses constitutional problems. The due process objection to recognition of preclusion consequences in such circumstances is exemplified by Harnischfeger Sales Corp. v. Sternberg
DredgingCo." 3 The plaintiff sold a dredge to the defendant taking notes secured by a chattel mortgage for a part of the purchase
price. Later, the plaintiff commenced a suit to enforce the mortgage and prayed for a personal judgment of $16,000 on the notes.
The defendant appeared and moved to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. The motion was denied and the defendant contested the
claim on the merits alleging that the dredge was defective and did
not meet warranties. The trial court rendered judgment for the
plaintiff; however, the Louisiana Supreme Court limited the judgment to the enforcement of the lien, holding that personal jurisdiction did not lie over the defendant. The plaintiff then asserted
a second action against the defendant in Mississippi and attempted to plead the prior judgment in bar against the defendant's
affirmative defense of defective machinery and breach of warranty. The trial court struck the plea and judgment was rendered
for the defendant. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court reinstated the plea and granted summary judgment for the plaintiff.114
Thus, even though Louisiana found that it had only such jurisdiction as to warrant foreclosing the interest of the nonresident in
the chattel situated in the state (the dredge), Mississippi, through
the use of collateral estoppel, gave the Louisiana judgment the
same effect as if it had been rendered on the basis of inpersonam
jurisdiction. If the fairness of that result can legitimately be debated because it allowed the plaintiff to evade the limitations surrounding Louisiana's assertion of jurisdiction," 5 should a fairer
113. 189 Miss. 73, 191 So. 94 (1939).
114. Id. at 97-98, 191 So. at 99.
115. See Taintor, supra note 25, at 226. ("It is submitted that an attempt to force defendant to choose between abandonment of his property without defense and submission to
the court for all purposes contravenes. . . due process of law."). In essence, all that the
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decision necessarily result simply because traditional terminology
is eschewed, but the results realized by the former doctrine are
retained? In other words, a limited personal jurisdiction doctrine,
when coupled with the readiness of a state to give the judgment
greater effect than would the rendering court, raises the same
problems that the old in rem jurisdiction doctrine did when it was
coupled with the right to make a limited appearance. A litigant
must not only consider what effect the rendering state would give
the judgment since the enforcing state is required under the full
faith and credit clause to give the judgment the same effect, but
also must consider whether the enforcing state would give the
judgment more credit than the clause required. Indeed, abolition
of traditional in rem jurisdiction may put the nonresident in an
even greater quandary than before. Formerly, in the absence of a
right to enter a limited appearance to which no collateral estoppel
consequences attached, a nonresident was forced to choose between abandonment of his or her forum property without defense
or submission to the forum for all purposes. But at least the nonresident could weigh the economic consequences of his or her decision. After Shaffer, the nonresident still faces the crucial
question whether to present his or her jurisdictional challenge in
the forum and defend on the merits or abandon all defenses to the
forum action and preserve the jurisdictional question for review
when enforcement of the judgment is sought. The quandary is all
the more serious because forum contacts formerly capable of characterization in a manner to sustain the exercise of in rem jurisdiction so that both the jurisdiction of the rendering and of the
enforcing courts could be preserved, must now be integrated into
a jurisdiction theory that logically demands an either/or choice
between the two courts in the sense that either the court has the
power to resolved the entire controversy or it does not.
A superficially plausible mechanism for avoiding this problem
is for the rendering state to simply deny actions (predicated upon
less than sufficient forum contacts to warrant the exercise of inpersonam jurisdiction) any claim or issue preclusion effect. If a forum voluntarily undertakes to so limit its judgments or is
compelled by fourteenth amendment due process constraints to do
so, this at least obviates the full faith and credit problem. The
enforcing forum need give only such faith and credit to the judgplaintiff in Harnischfegerlost was the immediate opportunity to execute on all property of
the defendant to the full extent of his claims, a meaningless concession if all of the defendant's Louisiana assets had been attached.
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ment of the rendering state as the rendering state itself would give
to the judgment. Of course, such a procedure simply assumes that
for all cases the interest of fairness to the parties outweighs effi-

ciency of judicial administration. Such an assumption may be
readily criticized as not only being unestablished but also overinclusive. Nonetheless, were a state to disclaim any interest in adjudicating interests other than in the specific property before the
court, the full faith and credit clause would not require another
state to give issue preclusive effect to the judgment of the rendering state. However, while the courts cannot give less faith and
credit to the judgment than would the rendering state, due process
constraints may not impede the courts from giving more credit
than the clause requires (as Harnischfeger indicates). The hope
that foreign jurisdictions would respect the disclaimer may be unavailing. I16 Moreover, as all assertions of jurisdiction would be
insulated from claim or issue preclusive consequences within the
forum, this would encourage nonresidents to appear. A subse116. In Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844
(1969), the court viewed the Seider doctrine, see note 83 supra, as insulated from constitutional attack because New York, in following that doctrine, granted to the nonresident the
right to make a limited appearance to which the forum could not attach issue preclusion
consequences. Yet, as noted by the court:
Whatever the right rule may be as to quasiin rem judgments generally, we think it
clear that neither New York nor any other state could constitutionally give collateral estoppel effect to a Seiderjudgment when the whole theory behind this procedure is that it is in effect a direct action against the insurer and that the latter
rather than the insurer will conduct the defense. To be sure it may be cold comfort to a nonresident defendant to have our assurance that if some state should be
so misguided as to consider a New York Seiderjudgment as concluding him, he
will be able to have this ruling overturned by the Supreme Court of the United
States. But we cannot fairly hold that New York has denied due process merely
because of the possibility that some other state may do so.
Id. at 112. It is not necessarily clear, however, why due process ought to preclude application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel by a sister state. Even if the Seider doctrine is
viewed as a judicially begotten direct action statute, see, e.g., O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving
Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), afd, 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1034 (1978), emerging notions of privity and adequacy of representation, coupled with
the substantial identity of issues between the first and latter actions, might constitute a
proper basis upon which to give estoppel consequences to a Seider-type judgment. See,
e.g., Cauefield v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 378 F.2d 876 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 389 U.S. 1009
(1967) (plaintiffs who sought relitigation of defendant's liability for desecration of a cemetery barred by a prior action to which they had not been parties but in which they had
appeared as witnesses); see generaly, Comment, The ExpandingScope of/the Res Judicata
Bar, 54 TEXAS L. REV. 526 (1976); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 85
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975). It must be acknowledged that the Cauefeld decision has not
received widespread acceptance. See, e.g., Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666, 670 (6th Cir.
1973) (characterizing Cauefeld as being confined to the "unusual facts of that case"). Of
course, where the parties are the same in both actions, problems attendant to the use of
judgment preclusion by or against non-parties are not present.
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quent court, faced with the identical claims and the identical parties, would then have to exercise great restraint to avoid giving
any recognition of the former adjudication. In an era of exceedingly overcrowded court calenders, such an expectation may be
largely wistful.
On the other hand, the argument may be made that the fourteenth amendment not only imposes constitutional limitations on
what attributes the rendering state could give the judgments, but
also limits, under due process standards, the degree of recognition,
by way of comity or internal operational efficiency, that the enforcing state could give the judgment.
Such an approach would enable the states to retain their jurisdiction over property within the state without prejudicing the interests of nonresidents by the extraterritorial impact of the
judgment. However, it is debatable whether reconstitution of the
in rem concept is prudent. Associating in rem considerations directly with the full faith and credit clause would result in the application of two different doctrines to the same problem. For each
case, courts would be required to (1) measure forum-related contacts, forum interests, and concepts of fairness to determine
whether jurisdiction could be exercised over the nonresident, and
(2) characterize the action as inpersonam or in rem for the application of the jurisdiction's rules of claim and issue preclusion.
Shaffer accomplished very little if the in rem concepts, brought
into the case through use of a two-tiered hierarchical approach,
has simply been moved from the front door to the servant's entrance for consideration.
There is a further argument against an approach that would
limit, by way of comity or internal operational efficiency, the degree of recognition an enforcing state could give the judgment.
Such an approach would be based on two required findings: first,
that it violates due process of law for a state to treat a claim or
defense as merged or barred by a sister state judgment which was
rendered by a court which had jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendant and where the claim or defense sought to be precluded
arose out of the same transaction or occurrences that provided the
rendering court with jurisdiction over the matter in the first instance; and second, that it violates due process for a sister state to
treat an issue as foreclosed from relitigation where that issue was
actually litigated in a prior action which resulted in a judgment
rendered by a court which had jurisdiction to affect legal interests
of the nonresident defendant. It is not an overstatement to suggest
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that such a construction and application of the due process clause
would constitute a significant expansion of federal involvement in

the administration of state judicial proceedings that would far

transcend previous Supreme Court decisions in this area." 7 In
essence, to give effect to one state's decision to adjudicate a controversy, where the forum contacts are insufficient to sustain the

exercise of full inpersonamjurisdiction, would require that a sister
state, even the state of the defendant's residence, be precluded

from furthering its goal of avoiding multiple, recurrent litigation
of the same claim." 8 This simply begs the question of why the
fourteenth amendment is construed so as to allow the plaintiffcreditor to sue the defendant-debtor wherever the plaintiff can lo-

cate assets sufficient to satisfy bare constitutional minimums regarding the exercise of jural power, and to do so without fear of
adverse consequences such as merger (should plaintiff's claim be
9
greater than the attachment) or bar (should it be less)."
Correspondingly, if the defendant appears, why should the
fourteenth amendment now be construed to allow him or her to
relitigate his or her liability? If the defendant does not appear
when the fourteenth amendment says that the state may compel
defendant to do so to protect his or her property, 2 ' why should
the fourteenth amendment protect defendant from the consequences of that failure? Does the quantum of forum contacts bear

any significant relationship to the question whether relitigation
117. While it has been argued that due process constraints militate against giving a
sister state judgment greater effect than it would have in the rendering state, see, e.g., Taintor, supra note 25, the impact of such a doctrine has not been critically examined. Rather,
positions are drawn on the basis of the basic fairness or unfairness of forcing the nonresident to make the election to appear or to forfeit. In other words, analysis has been limited
to the circumstances surrounding the election rather than extended to include the judgment
consequences of the election. Of course, prior to Shaffer the latter consequences were subsumed in the former.
118. It should be observed that in analogous cases the courts have held that representation by another, coupled with an opportunity to involve oneself as a party litigant, can
create issue preclusion. See note 116 supra; see also Provident Tradesmen's Bank and
Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 114 (1968) ("Of course, when Dutcher [the absent
party] raises this defense he may lose . . . on the ground that the issue is foreclosed by
") (dictum).
Dutcher's failure to intervene in the present case ..
119. Although an adverse judgment against the plaintiff is a possibility even in default
proceedings, the likelihood of such a result (or of such a decision on the merits) is exceedingly slim. While no empirical proof exists to support the claim, the intuitive position is
that even if one failed to prove his or her case before a judge in a default proceeding, the
court would invariably be willing to treat the subsequently entered dismissal as "without
prejudice" to the maintenance of another action.
120. See, e.g., Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry Inc., 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978);
Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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ought to be tolerated? This is more than merely an academic

question. A party to an action who has lost the certainty of judgment consequences provided by pre-Shaffer decisions must now
evaluate the judgment consequences under the integrated theory
espoused in Shaffer. Unfortunately, Shaffer itself provides no
guidance to the proper resolution of the problem. Indeed, Shaf-

fer's reliance upon forum contacts as part of its modified view of
territorialism may be counterproductive. 21 No meaningful difference exists insofar as the question of preclusion is concerned between situations where minimal forum contacts allow the exercise
of a constrained jurisdiction and situations where the quantum of
contacts allows an unrestrained exercise of jurisdiction. Rather, a
court should focus upon those factors which truly bear upon the

objectives of barring relitigation where a party has already litigated or intentionally bypassed an opportunity to litigate. Reliance upon the quantum of contacts submerges the social goals
behind precluding repetitive litigation and causes courts to lose
sight of what ought to be the main focus of inquiry-did the nonresident have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues involved in the first action, coupled with an interest in fully
litigating the questions there at issue?' 22 The finding that the
court in the first action has jurisdiction over the parties only begins the analysis; it does not conclude it as an hierarchical ap-

proch would suggest.
In summary, Shaffer's radiations will have a profound effect

upon questions of judgment preclusion due to its insistence that
121. Territorialism is a concept based upon the recognized power of each sovereign
entity to affect changes in legal interests of persons or property within its borders. Territorialism has often been equated with physical power. See, e.g., McDonald v. Mabee, 243
U.S. 90 (1917) ("The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power."). In the modem era,
territorialism may possess a more constrained interpretation. See, e.g., Kirgis, The Roles of
Due Process and Full Faith and Creditin Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 94 (1976):
Because states are defined territorially, and because most people are comfortable with the proposition that it is a state's legitimate business to attach rules to
matters or persons having a genuine connection with its territory, a power limitation based on territoriality makes sense. If the rule the state seeks to impose applies to an event within the state's territory, or to a person who has some relatively
stable relationship with the state (such as residence, domicile, or place of business), an observable link exists to justify the exercise of power.
Id. at 97. The modem view of territorialism is based more on the justification to act than
the naked physical ability to act. As such, the main point of distinction today between
territorialism and the reasonable relationship test of InternationalShoe is the intensity of
the nexus between the nonresident and the forum, with a more liberal standard of sufficiency employed under the reasonable relationship test.
122. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1 (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1973).
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courts treat assertions of jurisdiction for what they
are-proceedings against the legal interests of persons. Consequently, in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction, a court ought
to consider whether, under the fairness rationale of Shaffer, it is
appropriate to subject the nonresident to the jurisdiction of the
forum's courts and to bind him or her by way of preclusion by
judgment.
This "fairness" test will necessarily be broad and it would be
foolhardy now, or perhaps ever, to attempt to state its limitations.
As Professor Michelman has noted, fairness resists being cast into
a simple, impersonal, succinct formula.123 The sense of the test is
more intuitive than legal. A more definite method of forum
calculus would be desirable, yet, until such a calculus is perfected,
courts must nonetheless begin to estimate and factor into their
decisionmaking process the final judgment consequences (claim
and issue preclusion) of their decision to assume jurisdiction.
B.

The ProperRelationsho Between Choice of Law andForum
Allocation

What law will be applied to a particular controversy is a matter of no small concern to the parties. Choice of law questions
become particularly relevant in the situation where application of
the law of a particular jurisdiction will redound to the tactical
benefit of one of the litigants. Questions ofjurisdiction and choice
of law interrelate in situations where adjudication of the controversy in one place as opposed to another will be outcome-determinative or at least to some significant extent outcome-influencing.
The likelihood of a different result turning solely upon forum selection has largely been avoided by many modern choice of law
theorists.' 2 4 Rather, the problem is characterized as unavoidable
and unresolvable. 25 In the absence of a reasoned basis for permitting forum shopping, 26 the wisdom of setting aside substantive
interests due to a collateral decision regarding where geographically the case may be adjudicated is questionable at best. Perhaps
Professor Currie was correct in his view that resolution of true
conflicts could not be undertaken by the judiciary through choice
123. See Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the EthicalFoundation of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1250 (1967).
124. See Currie, supra note 73, at 261-68, B. CURRIE, supra note 73, at 119-27.
125. Id.
126. See Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REv.
1133, 1285 n.74 (1977).
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of law methodology. 2 7 This does not, however, suggest that the
true conflicts case is properly decided, sub silentio, through the
means of jurisdictional analysis. To focus upon jurisdictional
analysis and ignore the choice of law consequences of forum selection is to act like the spider who with his web catches the fly
and lets the hawk go free. The choice of law resolution will inevitably be molded and shaped by the decision to assert jurisdiction;
yet, too often the scope of legal analysis has not been extended to
catch the prey.
This relationship between jurisdiction and choice of law is
both synergistic and basic. Nevertheless, it has generally received
little attention from the courts.128 Where some attention has been
given to this relationship, it has generally been limited to an observation that similar, legally significant factors may support or
undermine the assertion ofjurisdiction or application of local law.
Courts have suggested that the quantum of forum contacts necessary to support the assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident is
less than, 2 9 or greater than, 30 that necessary to support the application of the forum's law or the law of a concerned state. This
same two-tiered evaluation of forum contacts has been expressed
by commentators. ' 3 ' What such discussions ignore is that juxtaposing the forum contacts required under the alternative standards of jurisdiction and choice of law is not the same as
evaluating the synergistic effects of the two concepts.
For example, Professor Silberman has argued that:
The Hanson [v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958)] Court's implication, one apparently reasserted in Shaffer, is that more
contacts with the forum state are needed for jurisdiction than
for choice of law. I suggest that this implication is counterintuitive. The impact of a conflict of laws decision more seriously
affects the rights of the parties than a decision on jurisdiction,
which merely directs the parties to an appropriate forum in
which to litigate their case. In Hanson, for example, two different state courts, one in Delaware and one in Florida, adjudicated an issue concerning the disposition of $400,000. Each
court applied the law of its own state and each arrived at a
different result, with the victorious Florida plaintiffs losing in
127. See Currie, supra note 73, at 261-68; B. CURRIF, supra note 73, at 119-27.
128. See Ehrenzweig, 4 ProperLaw in a ProperForun" A Restatement ofthe "Lex Fori
4pproach," 18 OKLA. L. Rav. 340, 350 (1965); see also Comment, .t the Intersection of
Jurisdictionand Choice ofLaw, 58 CALIF. L. REv. 1514 (1971).
129. See Henry v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 508 F.2d 28, 36 n.18 (3d Cir. 1975).
130. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977).
131. See Silberman, supra note 70, at 82.
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the opposite posture in Delaware. I am confident that, given
the choice, the Florida plaintiffs would rather have litigated in
a Delaware court applying
Florida law than in a Florida court
3
applying Delaware law.
Professor Silberman's interpretation of Hanson is well reasoned. However, in situations where one of the parties is likely to
be prohibited as a practical matter from litigating in the alternative forum,1 3 3 or where the preference for one forum over the
other is predicated not only upon choice of law considerations but
also upon practical factors relating to convenience of parties and
witnesses and ability to present the case to a trial court, the choice
of law issue may lose its priority. After all, from a plaintiff's perspective, some forum applying any law is preferable, intuitively, to
no forum at all.' 34 These alternatives are not advanced to undermine the suggestion that choice of law decisions often impact
more greatly upon the interests of the litigants than geographic
forum selection problems; rather, they point out that the solution
is not necessarily simply to construct different quanta of proof that
must be established to assert jurisdiction or apply local law-so
many forum contacts for jurisdiction, so many forum contacts for
choice of law. 35 The type of analysis necessary is one that directs
courts to measure the total impact that the various jurisdiction
and choice of law alternatives may suggest when a forum allocation issue arises. In other words, in a situation such as the one
presented in Hanson, a complete forum allocation doctrine would
require the court to measure the total impact and propriety of allowing a Delaware court to apply Delaware law to the controversy, as opposed to the total impact and propriety of allowing a
Florida court to apply Florida law. Again, this analysis is not
simply outcome-determinative in the sense that a different result
compels the use of the forum's courts and the forum's laws.
Rather, decisional consequences should be measured against the
relationship between the involved fora and parties and the interests of the involved fora and parties in determining that a particular forum and rule of decision should be used.
This need to evaluate the whole impact of the exercise ofjurisdiction exists because both the constitutional measure necessary to
132.
133.
134.
(1976).
135.
strued.

Id. at 82-83 (footnotes omitted).
See, e.g., National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
See, e.g., Cornelison v. Chancy, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352
Nor is it suggested that Professor Silberman intended her remarks to be so conProfessor Silberman's analysis is correct as far as it goes.
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establish jurisdiction over a nonresident and that necessary to ap-

ply local law remains a minimal one.' 36 Those factors which under InternationalShoe 137 permit a court to assert jurisdiction over

a nonresident are inevitably the same factors which permit the forum to apply its own law. The criteria are simply evaluated from
different perspectives, the defendant's forum-related contacts being used in traditional jurisdictional analysis while the plaintiff's

relationship to the forum is often the focal point for choice of law
analysis.' 38 Yet, there is nothing inherent in the methodology of
forum allocation which demands that state interests lose their relevancy when considered in connection with forum selection t 39 or
that forum-related contacts lose their relevancy when considered
in connection with choice of law questions. 4 ° Unless the Court is

prepared to reassess its decisions in Clay'' and International
Shoe," 2 the inescapable conclusion is that in the overwhelming

majority of cases the question a court must address is whether,
where the assertion of both jurisdiction and local law is on marginal grounds, it is fair in the constitutional sense for the forum to
accept both aspects of the case for adjudication. In other words,

where the assertion of jurisdiction or application of local law is, as
to one of the factors, clearly appropriate, assertion of the other
factor in the face of constitutionally minimal contacts may not
make the totality of the forum's involvement unfair. 14 3 If neither
factor is clearly established, the assertion of jurisdiction and appli-

cation of local law is suspect because jurisdiction and choice of
law operate together to produce a total impact that exceeds the
individual effects that either can generate alone.
For example, assume: Seller, operating out of State B, sells

through the use of catalogues which are obtained by residents of
136. See notes 65-92 supra and accompanying text.
137. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); see note 100 supra.
138. See text accompanying notes 82-92 supra.
139. See Fischer, State Interests, Ainimum Contacts, and In Personam Jurisdiction
Under Code of Civil ProcedureSection 410.10, 12 U.S.F. L. REv. 387, 415-17 (1978).
140. See text accompanying notes 65-92 supra.
141. Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 197 (1964); see text accompanying
notes 65-71 supra.
142. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); see note 100 supra.
143. For example, where the defendant moved to the forum after the cause of action
arose, the jurisdictional nexus between the forum and the defendant may be so strong that
it ameliorates the application of the forum's law to an out-of-state transaction. See, e.g.,
Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968). On the other
hand, where the plaintiff is the party who has moved to the forum, the weak jurisdictional
nexus militates against the application of the forum's local law. See, e.g., Reich v. Purcell,
67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).
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State A, including Buyer. Buyer orders goods from Seller and remits partial payment. Upon attempted delivery of the goods,
Buyer states that he has no storage facilities available. Seller, to
accomodate Buyer, has the goods placed in storage in State B.
Later, Seller again attempts delivery. Buyer inspects and rejects
the goods, asserting in good faith that they are nonconforming.
Assume that the law of State B would treat Buyer's actions as an
acceptance to which the right of rejection had lapsed. State A
would not treat Buyer's actions as an acceptance and would consider a good faith belief that the goods were nonconforming to
create a power of nonacceptance.
As shown by Diagram A, four alternative methods of adjudicating the dispute are possible if the forum resident commences
the action.
DiagramA
Local Law Applied

Foreign Law Applied

Action
filed in
State A

1. Resident Buyer
v.
Nonresident Seller

2. Resident Buyer
v.
Nonresident Seller

Action
filed in
State B

3. Resident Seller
v.
Nonresident Buyer

4. Resident Seller
v.
Nonresident Buyer

On the basis of the facts given, one would expect that a greater
degree of forum contacts and measurable indicia of forum interest
in the matter would be necessary to sustain the results in situations
1 and 3, inasmuch as in both cases the nonresident is obligated to
come to the resident plaintiff and subject himself or herself to the
local law of the forum. Consequently, fewer forum contacts or
indicia of forum interest would be necessary in situations 2 and 4,
as in those cases it is only the obligation to come to the resident
plaintiff that is involved; the nonresident retains the application of
his or her own state's law.'44 As between situations I and 2, the
court must evaluate the total relationship between the nonresident
and the forum as it relates to the claim before the court. The
greater the relationship, the easier it will be to substantiate situa144. Of course, the law of the forum may be more advantageous to the nonresident
than the law of his or her domicile. See, e.g., Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574,
522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974). Under such circumstances the nonresident will, of
course, prefer to go to his or her opponent's state in the hope that the forum will apply its
more favorable local law to the controversy.
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tion 1 over situation 2, and situation 2 over requiring the plaintiff
to go out-of-state and sue the adversary in the adversary's home
state.' 45 In effect, the remedy (or penalty depending on one's
point of view) amounts to an exercise of the common law maxim
actorforum rei sequitur, loosely translated as, "the plaintiff must
pursue the defendant in the defendant's forum."
The value of the above exercise is that it shows in schematic
fashion that controversies are problems with various aspects that
do not exist in isolation but which influence one another. Thus,
one does not (1) distinguish between situations 1 and 2 by first
evaluating forum contacts as they relate to forum selection and
then as they relate to choice of law determination, (2) evaluate
each question independently, and (3) classify the problem by placing it in a particular pigeonhole. Such a procedure is unsatisfactory because it assumes that a nonresident's relationship to the
forum and the forum's concern in the case differ between providing a forum and providing the rule of decision. Yet, with respect
to the forum's own courts, the concerns are overlapping and often
addressed by the same factors. A nonresident does not relate to a
forum one way with respect to jurisdictional questions and another way with respect to choice of law problems. Rather, nonresidents engage in acts which affect forum residents and impact
upon forum interests. It is out of these acts that legal consequences flow. And it is by an evaluation of those acts as a whole
that the legal relationship between the forum and the nonresident
should be created and defined. Jurisdiction and choice of law, at
least in an age of parochialism and congressional benign neglect,
constitute a total consequence to the nonresident. Thus, whether
the nonresident can be compelled to go to the plaintiff and have
145. The latter possibility, of course, gives rise to four additional jurisdiction/choice of
law alternatives:
DiagramB
Local Law Applied

Foreign Law Applied

Action
filed in
State A

5. Nonresident Seller
v.
Resident Buyer

6. Nonresident Seller
v.
Resident Buyer

Action
filed in
State B

7. Nonresident Buyer
v.
Resident Seller

8. Nonresident Buyer
v.
Resident Seller
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local law apply (situation 1), or can be compelled simply to go to
the plaintiff (situation 2), or can safely await the plaintiff who
must come to the defendant's forum turns upon the total evaluation of the factual relationship between the nonresident and the
forum, measured against the legal relationship created by classification of the problem into one of the categories described in Diagram A.
However, if the facts are amplified, the relationship between
the various categories is subject to change. Thus, if one adds the
additional circumstances that the transaction was initiated by the
resident buyer who requested the transmittal to him or her of the
catalogue and who solicited the order, it now appears that situation 1 becomes much harder to justify than situation 3, for here
the buyer's affirmative, aggressive conduct raises the level at
which state intervention becomes appropriate. Consequently, the
overall propriety of subjecting the nonresident to the forum's
court with the correlative application of the forum's local law is
diminished in situations where the need for state protection is
more difficult to justify.' 4 6 If application of forum law is of
greater consequence than the mere provision of a forum, the alternative provided by situation 2 may be unsatisfactory. On the
other hand, if the variations between the law of the competing
jurisdictions are not of major concern, the provision of a convenient tribunal to a forum domiciliary may be sufficient.
Clearly then, total forum interests may vary. For example,
where application of local law is important the forum has only
two possible alternatives-application of local law in its own forum (situation 1) or the hoped-for application of its own law in the
other forum (situation 6). Given that the other involved jurisdiction must be expected to have a parochial attitude with respect to
the interests of its own residents, the forum's only real alternative
is to evaluate the total fairness of using the category presented by
situation 1. Therefore, if State A should find that the relevant forum contacts and state interests warrant the exercise of jurisdiction and are not outweighed by the prejudice suffered by the
nonresident were he or she compelled to litigate in State A, those
146. Where the initiative for the transaction comes from a forum resident, the interest
of the state in protecting its residents is lessened. The forum resident, having taken affirmative action to deal with the nonresident, can be said to have assumed the risk that any
litigation connected with the transaction will be conducted outside the jurisdiction at a
place more convenient to the nonresident defendant. See Fischer, supra note 139, at
420-24.
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same forum contacts and state interests will invariably call for the
application of local law. This is not to suggest that all choice of
law questions are merely disguised jurisdictional questions or vice
versa. What it does suggest is that a number of hard cases in
which jurisdiction and choice of law issues are factually intertwined could be more profitably analyzed by recognizing the synergistic characteristics of the two doctrines and resolving any
problems accordingly.
C. The New Methodology Ushered in by Shaffer
The most important result of Shaffer will be the fundamental
changes it will produce in the way forum allocation decisions are
perceived. In the context of this paper, two consequences arising
from the jurisdictional perspective ushered in by Shaffer have
been noted. First, Shaffer's emphasis upon the relationship
among the nonresident defendant, the controversy, and the forum
negates the traditional use of jurisdiction theory to preserve the
interests of sister states over the affairs and concerns of their own
residents.147 Determinations of the scope of judgments rendered
which were easily orchestrated through the inventive use of in rem
concepts 48 and constrained constructions of the term "cause of
action' 49 can no longer be so facilely managed. Second, Shaffer,
in continuing a process begun in InternationalShoe,' has further
refined the jurisdictional test into one which closely approximates
in scope and form the constitutional standards for choice of law
applications.' 5 ' Hence, since both the jurisdictional and choice of
law tests proceed upon a basic foundation of due process fairness,
there is little utility or value in treating the two concepts disparately. This view is enhanced when one realizes that the sole point
of difference between the two concepts-that of perspective l 52 -is
generally subsumed by the tendency of courts to ignore the synergistic effect of resolving interrelated issues.
The effects of these observed consequences on post-Shaffer jurisdictional analysis may be more clearly seen in the factual set147. See notes 51-52 supra and accompanying text.
148. See note 53 supra and accompanying. text.
149. See note 23 supra.
150. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
151. See text accompanying notes 65-92 supra.
152. The difference is that jurisdictional questions are resolved from a perspective oriented toward measuring the defendant's forum-related contacts, while choice of law ques-

tions are often resolved from a perspective oriented toward measuring the plaintiffs
relationship to the forum. See text accompanying notes 82-92 supra.
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ting of Cornelison v. Chaney.'53 In Cornelison, the defendant, a
resident of Nebraska, was involved in an automobile collision
with the plaintiff, a California domiciliary, just on the Nevada
side of the California-Nevada border. At the time of the accident,
the defendant was en route to Long Beach, California, on one of
approximately twenty business trips he made to California each
year. The California court sustained the exercise of jurisdiction
54
over the nonresident defendant.'
In reaching its decision, the court articulated a two-question
test for determining whether to exercise jurisdiction on a minimum contacts premise over a nonresident: (1) whether the relationship between the nonresident and the forum is of such a
systematic, continuous, and wide-ranging nature that jurisdiction
exists over the nonresident as if he or she were domiciled within
the forum,' 5 5 or (2) whether jurisdiction over the nonresident exists because (a) the cause of action arises from or is in connection
with the nonresident defendant's forum-related conduct; (b) it is
fair under the circumstances to exercise jurisdiction over the nonhas an interest in asserting jurisdiction
resident; and (c) the forum
56
over the nonresident.1
It should be noted that under the court's conventional analysis
of the forum selection issues two important consequences of the
decision to assert jurisdiction were ignored. First, because the
court sanctioned the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the defendant could be forced to assert claims for injuries
(personal and property damages) in the California action that
would be instituted on remand. 5 Second, the almost inevitable
consequence of litigating the case in California, where the plaintiff
was a California resident, California law would be applied to resolve the issues.
Several observations regarding these consequences are in order. First, in justifying its decision to assume jurisdiction, the California court noted that the plaintiff (a witness in her case) resided
in California. 58 What the court did not note was that, as concerned any counterclaims, the defendant's witnesses were likely to
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
1977).
158.

16 Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1976).
Id. at 152, 545 P.2d at 269, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
Id. at 147, 545 P.2d at 266, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
Id. at 147-48, 545 P.2d at 266-67, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 354-55.
See text accompanying notes 97-105 supra; CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 426.30 (West
16 Cal. 3d at 151, 545 P.2d at 269, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
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be anywhere but in California. Thus, where the focus was limited
to the plaintiffs claims, the balance of hardships between litigating in California or Nevada could be seen as relatively even. Yet,
had the defendant's potential compulsory counterclaims been considered, that balance would not have remained. When it is observed that the decision to assert jurisdiction itself makes the
assertion of the counterclaims inevitable, the Court's balancing of
hardships is somewhat diminished where the hardships imposed
upon the defendant with respect to the litigation of counterclaims
are ignored.
A second consequence of the decision to exercise jurisdiction
was that California law would likely be applied to resolve the controversy.' 59 The obvious objection is that the application of California law instead of Nevada law should not turn simply upon the
placement of the litigation in the California court.' 6 ° This objection is stronger when it is observed that the measure of forum interest used by the court to assert jurisdiction was the mere fact of
plaintiffs California residency. Consequently, once having assumed jurisdiction on a theory of state interest, it is unlikely that
the court would decline to apply forum law to resolve the controversy.
The problems associated with choice of law concerns are not,
however, limited to the academic question of which law to apply.
There is the functional problem of handling a case where California law will likely be applied to resolve the validity of plaintiffs
claims while the law of another jurisdiction will be applied to the
counterclaim. Unless the forum adopts a choice of law theory
predicated upon pure protectionism of local residents or officious
intermeddling into the affairs of nonresidents, there seems to be
little reason for the application of California law to a dispute
16
brought by a nonresident which arose outside the forum.
Although it cannot be said that the result in Cornelison would
have been different had these considerations been reviewed by the
159. Where California has refrained from applying its own law it has generally done so
where its interest was minimal and could only be advanced at great cost to the interests of a
sister state. See, e.g., Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d
721, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978).
160. See text accompanying notes 65-92 supra.
161. In one case a California court did apply its own law in favor of a nonresident
against a California resident. Hurtado v. Superior Court, I1 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114
Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974). Hureado, however, is distinguishable in that the court, in applying
local law, was effectuating a state interest against the negligent operation of motor vehicles
in the state. Cornelison is inapposite because the negligent operation occurred in Nevada.
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court, it is nonetheless important to note that consequences meaningful to the parties did arise from the decision to assert jurisdiction. It is suggested that these consequences should not pass
unnoticed but should be consciously considered by the court at the
time the decision to exercise jurisdiction is made. When so evaluated, the court could easily have concluded that the assertion of
jurisdiction would lead to consequences which made adjudication
in California unfair from a due process perspective.
The impact of Shaffer is not limited to traditional inpersonam
actions such as Cornelison. Shaffer poses even greater problems
in the field of traditional in rem actions. These62 problems can be
examined through the following hypothetical.
Assume Creditor enters into a relationship with Debtor which
is formalized in State . The transaction carries an interest rate of
25% per annum which is a lawful rate of interest in State . To
secure the debt both as to principal and interest, Debtor creates a
security interest in real property he owns in State Y. The security
interest is created and executed in State Y, and the documents
memorializing the security interest are properly filed in State X.
Assume further that the Debtor is a resident of State , and that
the interest rate is usurious under the law of State Y.
The Debtor defaults. There are two possible locations where
suit can be commenced: in State X where the debt obligation and
security agreement were incurred and formalized or State Y
where the Debtor and the security are located.
The propriety of litigating the entire lawsuit in State X can
scarcely be doubted. The debt transaction, the parties, and the
circumstances giving rise to the debtor-creditor relationship all
arose in State A. State X has a valid interest in applying its law to
the controversy since the question of the enforceability of agreements entered into within the state are at issue.
Litigating the controversy in State Y is, however, an altogether
different question. First, while the presence of the security (the
land is in State Y) is a forum contact of sorts, it appears to be of
itself insufficient to sustain full in personam jurisdiction over
Creditor in State y. 161 Yet, it has been held that the intentional
creation of a res in the forum is sufficient to create a limited per162. The hypothetical is based upon Combs v. Combs, 249 Ky. 155, 60 S.W.2d 368
(1933), discussed supra at notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
163. At least this much must be conceded if Shaffer has any meaning whatsoever.
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sonal jurisdiction.

64

Moreover, the fact that the res involves re-

alty is some support for the assertion of a limited form of

jurisdiction. 65 This latter proposition results from the traditional
toward state control
deference the Supreme Court has exhibited
166
over real property within the forum.

If we assume that State Y can assert some form of jurisdiction,
probably limited to the property physically present in the state,
what impact does Shaffer have in this context? As previously

noted, under pre-Shafr analysis the jurisdiction (and interests)
of both States X' and Y could be preserved by commencing an in
rem action in State Y, where the land is situated.' 67 After Shaffer,

this approach is no longer feasible.
If State Y asserts a limited form of personal jurisdiction over
Creditor to adjudicate interests in the land which forms the secur-

ity for the debt, Creditor is in a difficult position. First, since the
realty is no longer considered the "cause of action,"' 68 Creditor
will likely lose his debt cause of action if he does not assert it in
the State Y proceeding.169 If he does, however, assert the claim,
he risks the possibility that State Y will treat the transaction as
usurious 7 and either disallow enforcement of that part of the
transaction or, worse yet, treat the counterclaim as a general appearance 7 1 and allow Debtor to institute a counterclaim for damages arising out of a transaction treated as usurious under the law
of State . Under the full faith and credit clause, this State Y
be enforceable in State X, where the transaction
judgment would
72
was legal.'
It is clearly the case that the consequences to Creditor of being
164. Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (jurisdiction acquired by attachment of nonresident's forum bank account).
165. See note 57 supra; see also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208 n.20 (1977).
166. See, e.g., Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909) (court not having jurisdiction over the
res cannot affect it by its decree). This so-called "land taboo" has not been favored. See
Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 620 (1954).
167. See notes 51-53 supra and accompanying text.
168. See note 23 supra.
169. See note 59 supra.
170. Most jurisdictions will recognize and enforce interest rates which are usurious
under the law of the forum as long as they are within an "acceptable" range. See Burr v.
Renewal Guaranty Corp., 105 Ariz. 549,468 P.2d 576 (1970) applying RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 203(2) (1971)). Where the differences between the forum's
permissible rate of interest and the specified rate are extreme, the situation may be otherwise. Cf., Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133
(1961) (refusing to recognize Massachusetts law on public policy grounds).
171. See Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938).
172. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908); note 39 supra.
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required to litigate a claim concerning interests in land situated in
State Y are immense. Yet, these consequences follow inevitably
from the integrated theory of jurisdiction espoused in Shaffer. It
is difficult to believe that the Court intended such far-reaching
consequences to result from its attempt to cure deficiencies in jurisdiction by attachment practices. Nonetheless, the problems exist and the only short-term solution is to ameliorate the effects of
exercising jurisdiction by exercising constraint in the decision to
assert jurisdiction. The above hypothetical presents an example of
a situation where the consequences of asserting jurisdiction are so
severe as, to render suspect any decision to proceed on the basis of
limited inpersonam jurisdiction. A proper approach would be for
State Y either to decline to assert jurisdiction or to stay proceedings and require the Debtor to institute a lawsuit in State X where
the entire matter could be adjudicated.
III.

CONCLUSION

The question has been posed: what are the obligations of
courts in rendering forum allocation decisions? As suggested
above, courts should analyze forum allocation questions with respect to the entire fact situation and the total consequences to be
realized by adopting possible alternatives rather than focusing
solely upon the contacts among the forum state, the defendant,
and the litigation. A proper regard for forum allocation would
not distinguish the question of jurisdiction from those of choice of
law or judgment preclusion. Rather, the totality of the allocation
would be contemplated and the decision where to decide the case
would be made according to this considered amalgam.
In essence, courts need to redefine their methodology in forum
allocation decisions so that all relevant facts and policies are considered in determining where a case having multistate aspects will
be adjudicated. It is hoped that such a process will foster a more
rational means of allocating judicial decisionmaking responsibility and reconcile the competing constitutional requirements of due
process and full faith and credit.

